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Abstract—In voting, disputes arise when a voter claims that
the voting authority is dishonest and did not correctly process his
ballot while the authority claims to have followed the protocol.
A dispute can be resolved if any third party can unambigu-
ously determine who is right. We systematically characterize
all relevant disputes for a generic, practically relevant, class of
voting protocols. Based on our characterization, we propose a
new definition of dispute resolution for voting that accounts for
the possibility that both voters and the voting authority can make
false claims and that voters may abstain from voting.
A central aspect of our work is timeliness: a voter should
possess the evidence required to resolve disputes no later than the
election’s end. We characterize what assumptions are necessary
and sufficient for timeliness in terms of a communication topology
for our voting protocol class. We formalize the dispute resolution
properties and communication topologies symbolically. This pro-
vides the basis for verification of dispute resolution for a broad
class of protocols. To demonstrate the utility of our model, we
analyze a mixnet-based voting protocol and prove that it satisfies
dispute resolution as well as verifiability and receipt-freeness.
To prove our claims, we combine machine-checked proofs with
traditional pen-and-paper proofs.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a society to accept a voting procedure, the public must
believe that the system implementing it works as intended,
that is, the system must be trustworthy. This is essential as
elections involve participants from opposing political parties
that may neither trust each other nor the election authority.
Nevertheless, there must be a consensus on the final outcome,
including whether the election is valid. This requires that
voters and auditors can verify that the protocol proceeds
as specified and detect any manipulations, even if they do
not trust the authority running the election. To achieve this,
the information relevant for checking verifiability may be
published in a publicly accessible database, known as the
bulletin board.
a) The need for dispute resolution: Ballots are cast
privately in elections. Thus only the voters themselves know
if and how they voted. If a voter claims that his ballot is
incorrectly recorded or that he was hindered in recording his
ballot, no other party can know, a priori, whether the voter is
lying or if there was a problem for which the voting authority
is responsible. We call such unresolved situations disputes.
When a dispute occurs, the honest parties must be protected.
That is, an honest voter who detects some manipulation must
be able to convince third parties that the authority was dishon-
est.1 In particular, when a voter checks whether his cast ballot
is correctly recorded, then either this is the case (respectively,
no ballot is recorded when he abstained from voting) or he
can convince others that the authority was dishonest. Another
problem is when a voter cannot even proceed in the protocol
to perform such checks, for instance when he is not provided
with a necessary confirmation. Hence, a timeliness guarantee
must ensure by the election’s end that an honest voter’s ballot
is correctly recorded or there is evidence that proves to any
third party that the authority is dishonest. Finally, in addition
to protecting the honest voters from a dishonest authority, the
honest authority must be protected from voters making false
accusations. That is, when the authority is honest, no one
should be able to convince others of the contrary.
b) State of the art: The vast majority of formal analyses
of remote e-voting protocols do not consider dispute resolution
at all, e.g., [1], [12], [15], [16]. Works that recognize the
importance of dispute resolution [6], [2] or that take aspects
of it into account when proposing poll-site [7], [10], [11],
[13], [17], [24], [38] or remote [39] voting protocols, reason
about it only informally. The most closely related prior works
define different notions of accountability [9], [27], [28] that
formalize which agents should be held accountable when a
protocol fails to satisfy some properties. These definitions are
very general, but have been instantiated for selected voting
protocols [9], [28], [29], [30]. The accountability properties
satisfied by these protocols do not guarantee the resolution of
all disputes considered by our dispute resolution properties.
We provide a detailed comparison of accountability and our
properties in Section VII.
c) Contributions: Our work provides a new foundation
for characterizing, reasoning about, and establishing dispute
resolution in voting. First, we systematically reason about
what disputes can arise in voting for a generic, practically
relevant, class of voting protocols. Our class comprises both
remote and poll-site voting protocols that can be electronic
or paper-based. We then focus on disputes regarding whether
the published recorded ballots correctly represent the ballots
cast by the voters. Based on our classification, we formally
define dispute resolution properties in a symbolic formal-
ism amenable to automated verification using the Tamarin
tool [32], [36]. This enables the analysis of a broad class
1Here dishonesty includes all deviations of the authority from the protocol
specification, both due to corruption or to errors.
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of protocols with respect to dispute resolution. Moreover, we
identify an important new property, which we call timeliness,
requiring that when a voter’s ballot is recorded incorrectly he
has convincing evidence of this by the election’s end. This
property ensures the resolution of disputes that could not be
resolved unambiguously in prior work.
Second, we demonstrate that timeliness can only be guaran-
teed under strong assumptions (for example, some messages
must not be lost on the network) by systematically analyz-
ing what communication channels and trust assumptions are
necessary and sufficient to satisfy this property. The result
is a complete characterization of all topologies in our voting
protocol class for which timeliness holds for some protocol.
Such a characterization can guide the design of new voting
protocols where timeliness should hold, e.g., by identifying
and thereby eliminating settings where timeliness is impossi-
ble. We formally verify the claimed properties using proofs
constructed by Tamarin and pen-and-paper proofs.
Finally, to simplify establishing dispute resolution in prac-
tice, we introduce a property, called Uniqueness, that can
be checked by everyone and guarantees that each recorded
ballot was cast by a unique voter. We prove for protocols
where voters can cast at most one ballot that Uniqueness
implies guarantees for voters who abstain from voting. This
has the practical consequence that in many protocols, the
corresponding guarantees can be proven more easily. We then
present as a case study a mixnet-based voting protocol with
dispute resolution and prove that our introduced properties
hold, as well as standard voting properties such as verifiability
and receipt-freeness.
Overall, our results can be used as follows. In addition to
specifying what messages are exchanged between the different
agents, a voting protocol in our class specifies (i) how the
election’s result is computed, (ii) which verification steps are
performed, and (iii) when the authority conducting the election
is considered to have behaved dishonestly. For (i), it is required
that each protocol specifies a function Tally. For (ii), as voters
must be able to check that no ballots were wrongly recorded
for them, a function castBy must map each ballot to the voter
that has (presumably) cast it. Only if this is defined can a
voter notice when a ballot was recorded for him that he has
not cast. Finally, dispute resolution requires that a protocol
defines a dispute resolution procedure such that everyone can
agree on (iii). For this purpose, a protocol must specify a
set of executions Faulty where the authority is considered to
have behaved dishonestly and which only depends on public
information and can therefore be evaluated by everyone.
Given a protocol with a dispute resolution procedure and a
communication topology, our topology characterization can be
used to quickly conclude if the given topology is insufficient
to achieve the timeliness aspect of dispute resolution. When
this is the case, one can immediately conclude that not all
dispute resolution properties can be satisfied. When this is not
the case, our formal definitions can be used to analyze whether
all dispute resolution properties indeed hold in the protocol.
Thereby, in protocols where voters can cast at most one
ballot, the guarantees for voters who abstain can be established
directly or by showing Uniqueness and inferring them by our
results.
d) Organization: We describe our protocol model in
Section II and the class of voting protocols for which we
define our properties in Section III. In Section IV, we classify
disputes and define our dispute resolution properties. We then
analyze in Section V the communication topologies where
timeliness can be achieved. In Section VI, we show how
dispute resolution can be established in practice, introduce
Uniqueness, and present our case study. Finally, we discuss
related work in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. PROTOCOL MODEL AND SYSTEM SETUP
As is standard in model-checking, we model the protocol
and adversary as a (global) transition system. Concretely, we
use a formalism that also serves as the input language to the
Tamarin tool [32]. Our model uses abstractions that ease the
specification of communication channels with security prop-
erties and trust assumptions. These kinds of abstractions are
now fairly standard in protocol specifications. We complement
existing abstractions [4] (e.g., authentic and secure channels
and parties that satisfy different kinds of trust assumptions)
with new abstractions that are relevant for dispute resolution
(e.g., reliable channels described in Section II-E2). Our proto-
col model is inspired by the model in [5] used for e-voting. We
first introduce some terminology relevant for voting protocols
and then our protocol model.
a) Terminology: We distinguish between votes and bal-
lots. Whereas a vote is a voter’s choice in plain text, a ballot
contains the vote and possibly additional information. The
ballots’ exact design depends on the voting protocol, but it
usually consists of the vote cryptographically transformed to
ensure the vote’s authenticity or confidentiality. When a ballot
is sent by the voter, we say it is cast. We denote by the (voting)
authority the entity responsible for collecting and tallying
all voters’ ballots. Usually, both the list of collected ballots,
called the recorded ballots, and the votes in the final tally are
published on a public bulletin board that can be accessed by
voters and auditors to verify the election’s result.
A. Notation and term algebra
We write [xi]i∈{1,...,n} to denote a list of n messages of the
same kind. Similarly, we write [f(xi, yi)]i∈{1,...,n} for a list
whose elements have the same form, but may have different
values. When the index set is clear from context, we omit the
indices, e.g., we write [x] and [f(x, y)] for the above lists,
and we write [x]i and [f(x, y)]i for the ith element in the
lists. Also, we write x := y for the assignment of y to x.
Our model is based on a term algebra T that is generated
from the application of functions in a signature Σ to a set of
names N and variables V . We use the standard notation and
equational theory, given in [4, Appendix A]. The symbols we
use here are 〈p1, p2〉 for pairing two terms p1 and p2, fst(p) and
snd(p) for the first and second projection of the pair p, pk(x)
for the public key (or the verification key) associated with a
private key (or signing key) x, and {m}sk for a message m
signed with the signing key sk. The equational theory contains
standard equations, for example pairing and projection obey
fst(〈p1, p2〉) = p1 and snd(〈p1, p2〉) = p2. We sometimes omit
the brackets 〈〉 when tupling is clear from the context.
We extend the term algebra from [4] with the following
function symbols and equations. We use ver(s, k) for signature
verification, where s is a signed message and k the verification
key. When the signature in s is verified with the (matching)
verification key k, the function returns the underlying signed
message m and otherwise it returns a default value ⊥. This
is modeled by the equations ver(s, k) = m, if s = {m}sk and
k = pk(sk), and ver(s, k) =⊥ otherwise.
Moreover, we use the function Tally to model the tallying
process in voting. Given a list of ballots [b], Tally([b]) denotes
the computation of the votes [v] in the final tally, possibly
including pre-processing steps such as filtering out invalid
ballots. The exact definition of Tally depends on the protocol.
Finally, castBy(b) denotes the voter who is considered to
be the sender of a ballot b. As with Tally, castBy(b) depends
on the protocol, in particular on the ballots’ design. For
example, in a voting protocol where a ballot b contains a
voter’s identifier (e.g., a code or pseudonym), castBy(b) maps
the ballot b to the voter with the identifier included in b. In
contrast, in a voting protocol where ballots contain a signature
associated with a voter, castBy(b) maps each ballot to the voter
associated with the signature contained in b.
As Tally and castBy are protocol dependent, each concrete
protocol specification must define the equations that they
satisfy, i.e., extend the term algebra’s equational theory with
equations characterizing their properties. Note that the func-
tions may not be publicly computable. For example, if only a
voter H knows which identifier or signature belongs to him,
then other parties are not able to conclude that castBy(b) = H .
B. Protocol specification
A protocol consists of multiple (role) specifications that
define the behavior of the different communicating roles.
We model protocols as transition systems that give rise to a
trace semantics. Each role specification defines the role’s sent
and received messages and signals that are recorded, ordered
sequentially. A signal is a term with a distinguished top-
most function symbol. Signals have no effect on a protocol’s
execution. They merely label events in executions to facilitate
specifying the protocol’s security properties. We distinguish
explicit signals that are defined in the specification and implicit
signals that are recorded during the protocol execution but are
not explicitly included in the specification. We explain how we
depict protocols as message sequence charts in Section VI-D2.
Roles may possess terms in their initial knowledge, which
is denoted by the explicit signal knows. We require that in a
specified role R, any message sent by R must either occur
in R’s initial knowledge or be deducible from the messages
that R initially knows or received in a previous protocol step.
Deducibility is defined by the equational theory introduced
above. As is standard, whenever R is specified to receive
a term that it already has in its knowledge, an agent who
instantiates this role will compare the two terms and proceed
with the protocol only when they are equal.
C. Adversary model and communication topology
We depict the system setup as a topology graph G = (V,E),
where the set of vertices V denotes the roles and the set
of (directed) edges E ⊆ (V × V ) describes the available
communication channels between roles (see e.g. Figure 1). For
two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2), we define the
standard subgraph relation G1 ⊆G G2 as V1 ⊆ V2∧E1 ⊆ E2.
By default, we consider a Dolev-Yao adversary [19] who has
full control over the network, learns all messages sent over the
network, and can construct and send messages herself. Addi-
tionally, the adversary can compromise participating agents to
learn their secrets and control their behavior. In a concrete
system model, we limit the adversary by trust and channel
assumptions. A (communication) topology [4] T = (V,E, t, c)
specifies the system setup by a graph G(T ) = (V,E), trust
assumptions by a function t : V 7→ trustType mapping
vertices to trust types, and channel assumptions by a function
c : E 7→ chanType mapping edges to channel types, which
denote a channel with certain properties. The types trustType
and chanType are specified in Section II-E, after the execution
model. When c is applied to an edge (A,B), we omit duplicate
brackets and write c(A,B) instead of c((A,B)).
D. Execution model, signals, properties, and assumptions
During protocol execution, roles are instantiated by agents
(i.e., the parties involved in the protocol) and we consider
all possible interleavings of agents’ runs in parallel with the
adversary. A trace tr is a finite sequence of multisets of the
signals associated with an interleaved execution. We denote by
TR(Pr, T ) the set of all traces of a protocol Pr that is run in
the topology T , i.e., run in parallel with the adversary defined
by the topology T .2 We write tr1 · tr2 for the concatenation
of two traces tr1 and tr2.
As previously explained, a trace may contain implicit sig-
nals, which are recorded during execution but omitted from
the protocol specification for readability, and explicit signals
(containing auxiliary information) that we explicitly add to
the protocol specification. Implicitly, when an agent A sends
a message m (presumably) to B, the signal send(A,B,m) is
recorded in the trace. Similarly, when an agent B receives m
(presumably) from A, rec(A,B,m) is recorded. Furthermore,
the signal K(m) denotes the adversary’s knowledge and is
recorded whenever the adversary learns a term m and hon(A)
is recorded when an honest agent A instantiates a role.
Furthermore, we use the explicit signal verifyC(H, b) to
indicate that an honest agent checks whether the ballot b,
which was cast by the honest voter H , is recorded correctly
(C stands for cast and indicates that H cast a ballot). In
protocols where voters can cast multiple ballots, this signal
2T may specify channels that are never used by Pr. Also, Pr may specify
channels that are not available in T . In the latter case, the corresponding
protocol steps cannot be executed and will not occur in the execution.
can occur multiple times for the same voter. Moreover, the
signal verifyA(H, bH) is recorded when an honest agent checks
for an honest voter H who has cast the set of ballots bH , that
no ballots other than those in bH are recorded for H . When
this check is done for H who abstained, then bH = ∅ (A
stands for the fact that H abstained from voting). verifyC and
verifyA may be defined such that they can be computed by
a machine but not by a human voter, e.g., when they require
cryptographic computations. We thus leave it open whether
they are performed by the voter H or by another agent such
as a helper device.
The explicit signal knows(A, x) is recorded when an agent
A has a term x in its initial knowledge. The explicit signals
Vote(H, v) and Ballot(H, b) respectively record an honest
voter H’s vote v and cast ballot b. The former is recorded
when H decides what to vote for and the latter is recorded
when H casts his ballot. Finally, the explicit signal BB(m)
denotes that a message m is published on the bulletin board.
We use subscripts to distinguish the signals recorded when
different messages are published on the bulletin board. For
example, the signals BBrec([b]) and BBtal([v]) denote that the
recorded ballots [b] and the votes in the final tally [v] are
published. We will introduce further signals as we need them.
We next define two kinds of trace properties. The first are
classical security properties, which are specified as sets of
traces. A protocol Pr run in the topology T , satisfies a security
property SS , if TR(Pr, T ) ⊆ SS . To reason about functional
requirements, we additionally define functional properties. For
example, the empty protocol satisfies many security properties
but it is useless for voting because, even in the absence of
the adversary, a voter’s ballot is never recorded. We will thus
require a functional property stating that a protocol must at
least have one execution where a voter’s ballot is correctly
recorded. We describe a functional property by a set of traces
SF , for example containing all traces where a voter’s ballot is
recorded. We then define that a protocol Pr run in the topology
T satisfies the property SF if TR(Pr, T ) ∩ SF 6= ∅. Finally,
we define protocol assumptions as sets of traces. That is, we
define so-called (trace) restrictions by giving a set of traces
and then only consider the traces in the intersection of this set
and TR(Pr, T ) (see e.g. Section II-E2).
E. Trust and channel types
1) Trust types: In the topologies, we consider four types of
trust on roles that reflect the honesty of the agents that execute
the role. A trusted role means we assume that the agents
who instantiate this role are always honest and thus strictly
follow their role specification. In contrast, an untrusted role
can be instantiated by dishonest agents (i.e., compromised by
the adversary) who behave arbitrarily. Dishonest agents model
both corrupt entities and entities that unintentionally deviate
from their specification, for example due to software errors.
We model dishonest agents by sending all their secrets to the
adversary and by modeling all their incoming and outgoing
channels as insecure (see the channel types below).
In addition, we consider the types trustFwd and trustRpl,
which assume partial trust. The agents who instantiate a
role of type trustFwd or trustRpl do not strictly follow their
role specification but, respectively, always correctly forward
messages or reply upon receiving correct messages. Such
assumptions turn out to often be necessary for the timeliness
property that we introduce shortly, as otherwise dishonest
agents that are expected to forward or answer certain messages
can fail to do so and thereby block other protocol participants.
Thus, these trust types enable fine grained distinctions to
be made about which assumptions are necessary for certain
properties to hold.
In summary, we consider the set of trust types trustType :=
{trusted, trustFwd, trustRpl, untrusted}. In the topologies, we
denote trusted roles by nodes that are circled twice (see e.g.,
BB in Figure 3a, p. 11) and the partial trust types trustFwd and
trustRpl by two dashed circles (see e.g., P in Figure 3a). In
our protocol class, there is no role that can be mapped both to
type trustFwd and to type trustRpl; thus the interpretation will
always be unambiguous. All remaining roles are untrusted.
2) Channel types: In addition to the trust assumptions, a
communication topology states channel assumptions. Chan-
nels, which are the edges in the topology graph, denote which
parties can communicate with each other. Also, channels
define assumptions, for example that limit the adversary by
stating who can change or learn the messages sent over a
given channel. Following Maurer and Schmid [31], we use
the notation A ◦−→◦ B, A •−→◦ B, A ◦−→• B, and A •−→• B
to denote a channel from (instances of) role A to role B that is
respectively insecure, authentic, confidential, and secure. For
a formal semantics for these channels, see [4].
We introduce two additional channel assumptions that are
useful for dispute resolution. These assumptions concern
whether a channel reliably delivers messages and whether
external observers can see the communication on a channel.
Usually, it is assumed that the above channels are unreliable
in that the adversary can drop messages sent. We make such
assumptions explicit and also allow for reliable variants of
channels. On a reliable channel, the adversary cannot drop
messages and thus all messages sent are received by the
intended recipient. We will see in Section V that such channels
are needed to achieve timeliness properties.
For dispute resolution, it is sometimes required that external
observers can witness the communication an agent is involved
in to later judge whether this agent is telling the truth. For
example, it may be required that witnesses can observe when
a voter casts his physical ballot by placing it into a voting
box. Such communication cannot later be denied, e.g. when
others witness that the voter has cast his ballot then the voter
cannot later deny this. Whereas it is in reality sufficient if
several witnesses, e.g., a subset of all voters, can observe such
communication, we model this by channels that specify that
any honest agent can observe such communication. Similarly,
we will also model the fact that sufficiently many parties can
decide who is right in a dispute by specifying that any party
can resolve disputes (see Section IV). Concretely, we model
communication that can be observed by others by undeniable
channels where any honest agent C /∈ {A,B} learns the
communication between A and B. This is in contrast to the
default deniable channels, where an honest agent C /∈ {A,B}
cannot determine that A and B are communicating with each
other.
A channel type can be built from any combination of the
three channel assumptions introduced above. For example,
on an insecure reliable channel, the adversary can learn all
messages and write messages herself, but she cannot drop
messages sent from A to B. However, for dispute resolution
not all combinations are useful. In particular, an undeniable
channel provides evidence that a message was sent, but this is
only useful together with the guarantee that the message is also
received. Hence, we only consider undeniable channels that
are also reliable. We thus distinguish the following channel
types, named after their most significant property: The default
channels ◦ d−→◦, • d−→◦, ◦ d−→•, • d−→•, which are neither reliable
nor undeniable, the reliable channels ◦ r−→◦, • r−→◦, ◦ r−→•, • r−→•,
which are reliable but not undeniable, and the undeniable
channels ◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•, which are both reliable and
undeniable.
We model the guarantees for senders and receivers that use
a reliable or undeniable channel by stating that each message
sent on such a channel is also received. We only require this
property when both the sender and the receiver of a message
are trusted or partially trusted and formally express it by the
following restriction.
{tr |∀A,B,m. t(A), t(B) ∈ {trusted, trustFwd, trustRpl}
∧ c(A,B) ∈ {◦ r−→◦, • r−→◦, ◦ r−→•, • r−→•, ◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•}
∧ send(A,B,m) ∈ tr =⇒ rec(A,B,m) ∈ tr}.
To model the additional guarantee that undeniable channels
provide, additional signals are recorded in the trace when
agents communicate over such channels. That is, whenever an
agent A sends a message m to B over an undeniable channel,
in addition to the signals send(A,B,m) and rec(A,B,m),
the signal Pub(A,B,m) is recorded. We formalize this by the
following restriction.
{tr |∀A,B,m. c(A,B) ∈ {◦ u−→◦, • u−→◦, ◦ u−→•, • u−→•}∧
(send(A,B,m) ∈ tr ∨ rec(A,B,m) ∈ tr)
=⇒ Pub(A,B,m) ∈ tr}.
In the rest of this paper, these two restrictions are always
stipulated. That is, whenever we use TR(Pr, T ) to refer to all
traces of the protocol Pr run in the topology T , we actually
mean all traces in the intersection of TR(Pr, T ) and the above
two sets of trace restrictions.
III. CLASS OF VOTING PROTOCOLS
Formal reasoning about dispute resolution in voting requires
a language for specifying voting protocols and their properties.
We provide such a language by presenting a class of voting
protocols for which we subsequently define dispute resolution
HD P Auth
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Fig. 1: The topology graphs GS (left) and GU (right). We
allow for any topology where G(T ) ⊆G GS or G(T ) ⊆G GU .
properties. Our class comprises both remote and poll-site vot-
ing protocols that can be electronic or paper-based. However,
we require a public bulletin board, which is, most of the time,
realized by digital means. We define the class by stating natural
restrictions that communication topologies and protocols must
satisfy to be in our class. Afterwards, we show that many
well-known voting protocols belong to this class.
A. Communication topologies considered
1) Topology graph: The topology graphs in Figure 1 depict
all possible roles and communication channels that we con-
sider. That is, we allow for any topology T whose G(T ) is
a subgraph of GS or GU in Figure 1. The node H describes
two roles for the human voters, one for voters who vote and
one for those voters who abstain. Also, there are roles for the
devices D and P, the voting authority Auth, a public bulletin
board BB, and the auditor A. In a concrete protocol, each role,
except for Auth and BB, can be instantiated by multiple agents.
We consider two kinds of setups, GS and GU in Figure 1,
for two kinds of protocols that differ in how ballots are cast.
GS provides the necessary channels for protocols where each
voter H knows his ballot and sends it to Auth using a platform
P. It models remote and poll-site voting. In the former case
P could be the voter’s personal computer, and in the latter
case P could be a ballot box, or an optical scanner that
forwards H’s ballot b to the authority for tallying. GU models
setups for protocols where a trusted platform P computes (e.g.,
encrypts) and casts the ballot for H . Often, such protocols do
not distinguish between H and P and P operates “in the name
of H”. Therefore, we model the setup of such protocols by
unifying the roles H and P into a single role voter H .
In some protocols, voters also have a personal off-line
device D. In contrast to P, D has limited capabilities and is not
connected to the authority. This models, for example, off-line
trusted digital devices or letters containing codes that may be
used to compute ballots.
Auth denotes the authority that is responsible for setting up
elections and collecting and tallying the ballots. Even though
some voting protocols describe the authority in terms of
several distinct roles, we collectively describe all these relevant
functionalities in a single role, except for the publication of
information, which is described by the bulletin board role
BB. We then also consider just one agent in the role Auth.
We will argue in Section IV that this is sufficient for our
dispute resolution properties. As depicted in Figure 1, Auth can
publish information on BB, which can be read by the auditors
and voters. An auditor performs checks on the published
information to ensure that the election proceeded correctly.
By modeling the auditor as a separate role, this role can be
instantiated by anyone, including the voters.
2) Topology assumptions: We further restrict the considered
communication topologies by making some minimal channel
and trust assumptions. As is common for many voting proto-
cols [5], [15], [16], [23], we model a secure bulletin board
and consider its realization as a separate problem. Such a
bulletin board can be used to send messages authentically and
consistently from the authority to all voters and auditors. We
thus assume that the roles BB and A exist and are trusted and
that the channels from Auth to BB as well as from BB to H
and A exist and are default authentic channels. Furthermore,
we only use the following partial trust assumptions. Auth can
be trusted to always reply with a confirmation upon receiving
a correct message (type trustRpl) and P can be trusted to
always forward messages correctly (type trustFwd), e.g., a
voting machine can be trusted to forward the entered ballots
to a remote server. The remaining channel and trust types
can respectively be assigned to any channels and roles. Note
that we support protocols using anonymous channels (e.g.
Civitas [15]) since, for the properties we consider, anonymous
channels can be modeled as our default channels.3
For dispute resolution, certain guarantees should hold for
an honest voter H , even with an untrusted or partially trusted
authority and even if all other voters are untrusted. Similarly,
the guarantees for the honest authority should hold even when
all voters are untrusted. We therefore only consider topologies
T where the roles H and Auth are untrusted or partially trusted
and analyze dispute resolution with respect to three variations
of T . We introduce the following notation. We single out a
distinguished voter H for whom the security properties are
analyzed. Given a topology T , T Auth
+H+ denotes the same
topology but where the trust assumptions about Auth and the
distinguished H are defined by t(Auth) = trusted and t(H) =
trusted, T Auth
+
is as T but with t(Auth) = trusted, and TH
+
is
as T but with t(H) = trusted. Note that in all variations, the
trust assumptions about the voters other than H are as in T .
B. Voting protocols considered
We next define the voting protocols considered in terms of
the protocols’ structure and which equations must be speci-
fied in the term algebra. Our definition allows for protocols
with re-voting, that is, where voters can send several ballots
(e.g., [15]). As explained in Section III-A, we allow protocols
where the voter H knows and casts his ballot or where a
trusted platform P casts the ballot, in which case we unify
the roles H and P .
1) Required functions and equations: A protocol specifica-
tion must define the equation satisfied by Tally([b]), defining
how the election’s result is computed from the list of recorded
ballots [b]. Similarly, a protocol must define the equation
satisfied by castBy(b), which must map each ballot b to a
3Distinguishing between anonymous and default channels is relevant when
analyzing observational equivalence properties such as coercion resistance.
However, for our possibility results, we only consider reachability properties.
voter, thereby specifying that this voter is considered to have
cast the ballot.
2) Protocol’s start and end: We assume that the protocol’s
setup can specify any number of voters and devices and any
relation between them, for example that each voter is associ-
ated with a unique trusted device. Also, at the protocol’s start
some public information may be posted on the bulletin board.
For example, this might be some election parameters or the
list of all eligible voters, denoted by BBH([H]). Furthermore,
some agents may know some terms such that these terms (or
associated terms) are initially published on the bulletin board
or known to other agents. For example, Auth’s public key
pkAuth := pk(skAuth) can be posted on the bulletin board at the
protocol’s start whereby Auth has the corresponding private
key skAuth in its initial knowledge. We require, however, that
at the protocol’s start no honest agent knows a voter H’s ballot
other than the voter himself.
We also assume that an election has two publicly known
deadlines that determine the voting phase’s end, i.e., when
ballots can no longer be cast, and the moment when all relevant
information is published. We denote the latter by the explicit
signal End in the BB role, which is recorded right after the
last message relevant for the election is published.
3) Tallying and publication of results: We assume that
ballots are collected and tallied by the authority Auth and that
the protocol allows voters to abstain from voting. Thus, Auth
starts the tallying process after the voting phase, even if not
all voters have cast a ballot. By the election’s end, all valid
ballots that were received by the authority have been published
on the bulletin board together with the votes in the final tally.
In protocols with re-voting, all ballots are published in the
list of recorded ballots and the tallying process is responsible
for removing duplicates. Finally, we assume that all messages
sent to the bulletin board are immediately published. That
is, whenever BB receives a message m, the signal BB(m) is
recorded in the trace.
C. Examples of protocols in our voting class
Our class comprises well known voting protocols such as
Helios [1], Belenios [16], and Civitas [15]. In these protocols,
voters can abstain from voting, the bulletin board is assumed
to be secure, and the recorded ballots are published on the
bulletin board as they were received by the authority. More-
over, even though these protocols all specify different roles
and setups, they can each be understood as instantiations of
the setups in Figure 1. Belenios and Civitas both have many
authority roles, such as registrars and different trustees, which
can be understood as our role Auth. In Belenios, the Bulletin
Board also performs some checks and computations. Thus, to
cast it in our protocol class, we must additionally interpret
those parts of Belenios’s Bulletin Board as part of our role
Auth and just the published part of Belenios’s Bulletin Board
as our role bulletin board BB.
Note that there are voting protocols, such as Bele-
niosRF [12], where the recorded ballots are re-encrypted be-
fore being published on the bulletin board to achieve stronger
privacy properties. Such protocols are not in our class.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In voting, the authority conducting the election should
behave as expected. That is, if the authority is dishonest, it
must be held accountable for this. For elections that are con-
ducted by multiple parties, we require that it is unambiguously
detectable when any of these parties misbehave, but we do not
require that it is detectable which of these parties misbehave.
This is sufficient to determine when “the system” running the
election does not proceed as expected and to take recovery
measures when this is the case, such as declaring the election
to be invalid. Thus, except for the bulletin board, we model
all of the parties involved in conducting an election as one
role (and agent) authority Auth and require that this agent is
held accountable if it does not behave as expected, i.e. does
not follow its role specification.
In contrast to the authority, we should not and cannot require
that all other parties, notably the voters, behave as expected.
In fact, a well-designed voting protocol should still satisfy its
expected properties for the honest voters, even when other
voters misbehave. We therefore only consider disputes with
respect to claims that the voting authority is dishonest.
We first explain why dispute resolution is needed in elec-
tions and characterize all relevant disputes. Afterwards, to
formalize our dispute resolution properties, we extend our
protocol model with additional signals and functions. We then
motivate the required properties using our classification and
formalize them using the model extensions.
A. Relevant disputes
After an election, all honest participants should agree on
the election’s outcome. A protocol where any manipulation
by the authority can be detected by suitable checks is called
verifiable. For voting, the gold standard is end-to-end veri-
fiability where the final tally consists of the honest voters’
votes, tallied correctly and this can all be checked. Often, this
property is divided into universal and individual verifiability.
Universal verifiability properties denote that some guarantees
hold (e.g., the tally is computed correctly) if an auditor
performs appropriate checks on bulletin-board data. Any voter
or independent third party can serve as an auditor and do such
checks. Therefore, if the universal verifiability checks fail, all
honest protocol participants will agree on this fact and such
checks never give rise to disputes.
Individual verifiability denotes that each voter can verify
that his own ballot has been correctly considered in the list of
recorded ballots. As only the voter knows which ballot he has
cast, this property relies on checks that must (and can only)
be done by each voter himself. Hence, individual verifiability
checks give rise to the following three problems, where a
voter claims that the authority is dishonest while other protocol
participants cannot determine whether the voter is lying.
(1) A voter is hindered from taking the protocol step where
he casts his ballot, in particular he cannot complete one of the
preceding protocols steps. There may be technical as well as
social reasons for this. For example, the voter may fail to be
provided with the necessary credentials in a setup phase or he
cannot access a polling station. For generality, we therefore
consider disputes regarding the inability to cast a ballot as out
of scope of this paper and focus in the following on disputes
concerning whether the recorded ballots correctly reflect the
ballots cast by the voters.
(2) A voter who successfully cast his ballot is hindered from
reaching the verifiability step. For instance, this can happen
when recording a ballot requires receiving a confirmation from
the authority, which is sent to the voter too late or not at all.
(3) A voter’s check whether his ballot is recorded correctly
fails. This can happen when a voter detects that one of his cast
ballots was not recorded correctly or when he detects that there
is a ballot recorded for him that he never sent.
As a result of the above reasoning, based on (3) we
distinguish two possible disputes that must be considered in
voting protocols, which are depicted in Figure 2. In both
disputes, a voter H’s and the authority’s claim about H’s cast
ballot differ, where the authority’s claim is denoted by the
information on the bulletin board. We take the standpoint that
the authority is responsible for setting up a working channel
to the bulletin board. That is, if messages are not on the
bulletin board that should be there, we consider this to be
the authority’s fault. In the dispute D1, a voter H claims that
he cast a ballot b, while the authority Auth claims that H did
not cast b and in the dispute D2 their claims are reversed.
Note that when H claims to have cast b and Auth claims that
H cast b′, this constitutes both a dispute D1 with respect to
the ballot b and a dispute D2 with respect to b′.
We require that when a voter learns that the authority Auth
did not record a ballot that he cast, he can convince the other
honest participants that Auth is dishonest. This is a prerequisite
needed to take recovery measures when such manipulations
occur. The same must hold when a voter learns that Auth
recorded a ballot for him that he did not cast. We respectively
denote these properties by VoterC(Auth) (in dispute D1) and
VoterA(Auth) (in dispute D2).
As explained in (2), it is also a problem when a voter who
casts a ballot is hindered from reaching his verifiability check
in due time. We thus require that a voter who casts a ballot
has some timeliness guarantees, namely that by the election’s
end either his ballot is correctly recorded or he has evidence
to convince others that the authority Auth is dishonest. We
denote this property by TimelyP(Auth).
Finally, it is possible that voters lie. Therefore, we require
that an honest authority Auth is protected from false convic-
tions in any dispute. We denote this by AuthP(Auth).
Some protocols support re-voting, where voters can send a
set of ballots, all of which are recorded on the bulletin board.
In this case, the dispute D1 denotes that H claims that at least
one of his cast ballots is not listed by Auth. We thus require
that VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth) hold for each cast ballot.
Dispute D2 means that H claims not to have cast some of
the ballots that are recorded for him. In such a dispute, the
Voter H claims that H Authority Auth claims that H Properties protecting H Properties protecting Auth
D1 cast ballot b did not cast ballot b VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth) AuthP(Auth)
D2 did not cast ballot b cast ballot b VoterA(Auth) AuthP(Auth)
Fig. 2: Possible disputes in voting. The authority’s claim is captured by the information on the bulletin board. The respective
disputes can be resolved when all properties in the third and fourth columns hold.
voter must be able to convince everyone that too many ballots
are recorded for him and that the authority Auth is dishonest.
This guarantee generalizes the property VoterA(Auth), which
we will define so that it covers both situations. As before, the
disputes D1 and D2 can occur simultaneously, for example
when H claims he cast the ballots b1 and b2 and Auth claims
that H cast b2 and b3.
B. Protocol model for dispute resolution
To formalize dispute resolution for our class of voting
protocols, we extend our protocol model from Section II.
It may be required that agents collect evidence to be used
in disputes. We use the signal Ev(b, ev) to model that the
evidence ev concerning the ballot b is collected. We model
the forgery of such evidence by allowing any dishonest agent
to claim that any term in its knowledge is evidence. That is, we
allow the adversary to perform an action that records Ev(b, ev)
for any terms b and ev such that K(〈b, ev〉).
As we have argued that all honest agents should be able to
agree on the outcome of disputes, we do not specify which
agents resolve disputes and how the collected evidence must
be communicated to them to file disputes. We merely define
that a voting protocol can generate evidence such that any
third party who obtains this evidence can, together with public
information, judge whether the authority Auth is dishonest.
Recall that in poll-site settings, undeniable channels are used
to model that sufficiently many witnesses can observe the
relevant communication in practice. In this context, requir-
ing that any third party can judge whether the authority is
dishonest models that sufficiently many parties can decide
this in practice. Abstracting away from these details allows
us to focus on which evidence and observations are required
to resolve disputes, independently of how undeniable channels
are realized in practice.
We thus model the verdict of whether Auth should be
considered dishonest by a publicly verifiable property Faulty,
which can be specified as part of each voting protocol,
independently of any role. Faulty(Auth, b) defines a set of
traces where the agent Auth is considered to have behaved dis-
honestly with respect to the ballot b, i.e., b has presumably not
been processed according to the protocol in these traces. For
example, Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃B, [b]. Pub(Auth, B, b) ∧
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]} specifies that Auth is considered
dishonest in all traces where the ballot b was sent from Auth
to an agent B on an undeniable channel but not included in
the recorded ballots [b] published on the bulletin board.
To ensure that the verdict whether a trace is in the set
Faulty(Auth, b) is publicly verifiable, the specification of
Faulty(Auth, b) must depend just on evidence and public
information. We thus state the following requirement.
Requirement 1. Faulty(Auth, b) may only be defined based on
the signals BB, Ev, and Pub.
Whereas the above example satisfies this requirement, the set
{tr |∃A,B,m, [b]. send(A,B,m) ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧m /∈ [b]}
is not a valid definition of Faulty(Auth, b), as send is not one
of the admissible signals.
As a consequence of the above requirement, not all signals
in a trace tr are relevant for evaluating whether tr satisfies
a given Faulty definition. In particular, let pubtr(tr) be a
projection that maps a trace tr to the signals in tr whose
top-most function symbol is one of BB, Ev, or Pub, while
maintaining the order of these signals. Then, it follows from
Requirement 1 that for all traces tr1 and tr2 such that
pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2), it holds that tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)
iff tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b).
C. Formal dispute resolution properties
We now use our extended model to define the dispute
resolution properties for our class of voting protocols. We
formalize each property from Figure 2 as a set of traces.
First, we consider the property VoterC(Auth) that protects
an honest voter who detects that one of his cast ballots is not
recorded correctly by the authority Auth. Intuitively, we require
that if this happens, the voter can then convince others that
the authority is dishonest. Specifically, the property states that
whenever an honest voter H (or one of his devices) reaches
the step where he believes that one of his ballots b should be
recorded on BB, then either this ballot is correctly included in
the list of recorded ballots on BB or everyone can conclude
that the authority Auth is dishonest. We define VoterC(Auth)
as follows (C denotes that a ballot has been cast).
Definition 1.
VoterC(Auth) := {tr | verifyC(H, b) ∈ tr
=⇒ (∃[b]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b]) ∨ tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Note that, for notational simplicity, here and in the rest
of the paper, when using set comprehension notation like
{x|F (x, y¯)}, all free variables y¯ different from x are univer-
sally quantified, i.e., {x|∀y¯. F (x, y¯)}.
The next property, TimelyP(Auth), states that an honest voter
H who casts a ballot b cannot be prevented from proceeding
in the protocol such that his ballot is recorded or, if he is
prevented, then he can convince others that the authority Auth
is dishonest. In particular, a voter’s ballot must be recorded
or there must exist evidence that the authority is dishonest
within a useful time period. Note that we do not require that
the resolution of disputes must take place before the election’s
end and there can be a complaint period afterwards. However,
we require that the necessary evidence exists by this fixed
deadline as otherwise it could be received after the complaint
period ended. We now define TimelyP(Auth).
Definition 2.
TimelyP(Auth) := {tr | ∃tr ′, tr ′′. tr = tr ′· tr ′′
∧Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
=⇒ (∃[b].BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b]) ∨ tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
The difference to VoterC(Auth) (Definition 1) is that we not
only require the property when a verifiability check is reached,
but whenever all the relevant information is published on the
bulletin board (indicated by End) and a voter’s ballot was
cast before this deadline. We illustrate this difference on an
example in Section VI-D3.
For abstaining voters we define VoterA(Auth). It states that
when an honest voter H who abstains from voting, or one
of H’s devices, checks that no ballot is recorded for H , then
either this is the case or everyone can be convinced that the
authority Auth is dishonest. We define this property such that it
can also be used in protocols with re-voting, where a voter who
cast a set of ballots bH checks that no additional ballots are
wrongly recorded for him. We define VoterA(Auth) as follows.
Definition 3.
VoterA(Auth) := {tr | verifyA(H, bH) ∈ tr
=⇒ ¬(∃[b], b. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ castBy(b) = H
∧ b /∈ bH) ∨ ∃b. tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Note that castBy is just a claim that H has cast a ballot and
does not imply that H has actually cast it. For example, in a
protocol where ballots contain a voter’s identity in plain text
and castBy(b) is defined to map each ballot to the voter whose
identity it contains, everyone can construct a ballot b such that
H = castBy(b), even when H has not cast it.
It is possible, of course, that a voter who claims that the
authority is dishonest is lying. Thus, for dispute resolution
to be fair, it must not only protect the honest voters but
also an honest authority. We formalize by AuthP(Auth) that
traces where the authority Auth is honest should not be in
Faulty(Auth, b) for any ballot b.
Definition 4.
AuthP(Auth) := {tr | hon(Auth) ∈ tr
=⇒ ∀b. tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b)}.
Even though the above properties are stated independently
of any adversary model, VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), and
VoterA(Auth) are guarantees for an honest voter H and must
hold even when the authority Auth and other voters are dis-
honest. Similarly, AuthP(Auth) constitutes a guarantee for Auth
and must hold even if all voters are dishonest. Therefore, we
define a dispute resolution property by stating what property
must be satisfied by a protocol (1) for the honest voter H , i.e.,
when the protocol is run in a topology where H is honest, and
(2) for the honest authority Auth. Additionally, it is usually
required that a protocol satisfies some functional requirement
when the agents are honest. Thus a dispute resolution property
also specifies (3) which functional requirement must hold
when both Auth and the voter H are honest.
Definition 5. Let pH and pAuth be two security properties that
must hold respectively for an honest voter H and the honest
authority Auth and let pf be a functional property that must
hold when both agents are honest. A protocol Pr, executed
in a topology T , satisfies the dispute resolution property
DR(Pr, T, pH , pAuth, pf ) iff
TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+) ⊆ pH ∩ pAuth ∧ TR(Pr, TH+) ⊆ pH
∧TR(Pr, T Auth+) ⊆ pAuth ∧ TR(Pr, T Auth+H+) ∩ pf 6= ∅.
For example, DR(Pr, T,VoterC(Auth) ∩ TimelyP(Auth) ∩
VoterA(Auth),AuthP(Auth), f) denotes that the protocol Pr
run in the topology T satisfies all previously introduced
properties in the required adversary models. That is, it satisfies
the properties VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), and VoterA(Auth)
for an honest voter H , the property AuthP(Auth) for an
honest authority Auth, and the functional property f for an
honest voter and the honest authority (see the next section
for an example of a functional property). Another dispute
resolution property that we consider in the next Section is
DR(Pr, T,TimelyP(Auth),AuthP(Auth), f), which states that
the timeliness property TimelyP(Auth) should hold for an
honest voter H while AuthP(Auth) is preserved for the honest
authority Auth.
V. COMMUNICATION TOPOLOGIES AND TIMELINESS
For TimelyP(Auth), it is a problem when messages are
lost as some protocol participants may be waiting for these
messages and thus cannot proceed in the protocol. Intuitively,
timeliness only holds under strong assumptions. We investigate
this next by systematically characterizing the assumptions
needed for TimelyP(Auth) to hold in our protocol class.
A. Problem scope
1) Dispute resolution property: We aim at achieving time-
liness guarantees for the voters while also maintaining the
AuthP(Auth) property for the authority Auth. Furthermore, we
are only interested in protocols where a voter’s ballot can
actually be recorded. To express the third requirement, we
formalize a functional property stating that for a given protocol
and topology, there must be an execution where an honest
voter H casts a ballot b and where this ballot is published
in the list of recorded ballots [b] on the bulletin board before
the last relevant information is published (indicated by End).
Moreover, this property must hold when all agents and the
network behave honestly. We denote by honestNetw the set of
traces where all agents follow the protocol and messages are
forwarded on all channels unchanged. The required functional
property is defined as the following set of traces.
Definition 6.
Func := {tr | ∃tr ′, tr ′′,H, b, [b]. tr = tr ′· tr ′′∧
Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
∧ tr ∈ honestNetw}.
Given a protocol Pr and a topology T ,
we would like the dispute resolution property
DR(Pr, T, TimelyP(Auth), AuthP(Auth),Func), which we
write for conciseness as TimelyDR(Pr, T ).
2) Additional assumptions: In standard protocol models,
honest agents can stop executing their role at any time. For
timeliness, this might be a problem as other agents may wait
for their messages and cannot proceed in the protocol. We thus
state the additional assumption that honest agents do not abort
the protocol execution prematurely. Similarly, we assume that
partially trusted agents execute the required action once they
can. Note that agents can still be blocked, e.g., when waiting
for messages that are dropped on the network.
Assumption 1. Honest agents always execute all protocol steps
possible and agents who instantiate a role that is trusted to
forward or answer messages, i.e., partially trusted, perform
this respective action once they can.
The assumption implies, for example, that when a role speci-
fies a send event after a receive event, the agent instantiating
the role will always perform the second step right after the
first one. However, an agent can also be blocked between two
consecutive protocol steps, for example when multiple receive
events are specified after each other and the agent must wait
for all of them.
Under the above assumption, we characterize all topologies
from our protocol class for which there exists a protocol that
satisfies TimelyDR, i.e., the set {T |∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, T )}.
As others [4], we introduce a partial order on topologies such
that a possibility result (i.e., the existence of a protocol such
that TimelyDR(Pr, T ) holds) for a weaker topology implies a
possibility result for a stronger topology. We then characterize
the above set by providing the “boundary” topologies, i.e., the
minimal topologies satisfying TimelyDR.
B. Communication topology hierarchy
We define a partial order on topologies that, given two
topologies, orders them with respect to their trust and system
assumptions. We first define a partial order on our trust and
channel types. For t, t′ ∈ trustType, t′ v t denotes that t is a
stronger assumption than t′. We thus have that untrusted v
trustFwd v trusted and untrusted v trustRpl v trusted.
We also define for two channel types c and c′ that c makes
stronger assumptions than c′. Formally, let v0 be the relation
where ◦ x−→◦v0◦ x−→•v0• x−→• and ◦ x−→◦v0• x−→◦v0• x−→• for all
x ∈ {d, r, u} and d−→v0 r−→v0 u−→ for all −→∈ {◦−→◦, •−→◦, ◦−→•
, •−→•}. We overload the symbol v and, for channel types, we
write v=v∗0, i.e., v is the reflexive transitive closure of v0.
Using the above, for two topologies T1 = (V1, E1, t1, c1)
and T2 = (V2, E2, t2, c2) we say that T2 makes at least
as strong assumptions as T1 if T2 uses channel and trust
assumptions that are at least as strong as those in T1 and if
T2’s topology graph includes all the roles and communication
channels that exist in T1:
T1 v T2 := G(T1) ⊆G G(T2) ∧ ∀(va, vb) ∈ E1.
c1(va, vb) v c2(va, vb) ∧ ∀v ∈ V1. t1(v) v t2(v).
We show next that defining the relation this way is useful for
relating possibility results for different topologies. In particu-
lar, if for a topology T it is possible to satisfy TimelyDR(Pr, T )
with some protocol, then for all topologies that make stronger
assumptions, there is also a protocol that satisfies the property.
The lemma is proven in Appendix A1.
Lemma 1. Let TI v TS be topologies in our class.
∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, TI) =⇒ ∃Pr′. TimelyDR(Pr′, TS).
C. Characterization of topologies enabling TimelyDR
We next present the minimal topologies satisfying TimelyDR
in our voting protocol class. In combination with the above
hierarchy, this allows us to fully characterize all topologies T
that enable TimelyDR(T,Pr) for some protocol Pr.
The minimal topologies are depicted in Figure 3 and de-
noted by T1, . . . , T7. Recall that the agents BB and A as
well as their incoming and outgoing channels have fixed trust
assumptions. In all topologies, there are roles for H, P and
Auth (respectively for H and Auth in T6 and T7), as this
is required to satisfy the functional property (H must cast
a ballot, P must forward it, and Auth must publish it on
BB). All topologies have a reliable path from H to Auth and
additional trust assumptions, such as (partially) trusted roles
or undeniable channels. We present some possible real-world
interpretations of these topologies in Section VI-A.
We now state the main theorem for our voting protocol
class: The set of topologies for which there exists a protocol
that establishes TimelyDR consists of all topologies that make
at least the assumptions that are made by one of the seven
topologies in Figure 3.
Theorem 1. Let T1, . . . , T7 be the topologies depicted in
Figure 3 and T be a topology in our voting protocol class.
(∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, T ))⇔ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}. Ti v T ).
We only explain the high level idea of the proof here and
refer to Appendix A2 for the details.
Proof Sketch. First, we establish necessary requirements for
topologies to enable TimelyDR, by showing by pen-and-paper
proofs that any topologies that do not meet these requirements
cannot satisfy TimelyDR with any protocol. Next, we show
that these requirements, which are met by the topologies
T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3 are sufficient. In particular, we prove by
automated proofs in Tamarin (see [35]) that for each topology
Ti ∈ {T1, . . . , T7} there exists a simple protocol Pri for
which TimelyDR(Ti,Pri). Finally, we show (by hand) that
the topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3 are the only minimal
topologies satisfying the necessary and sufficient requirements.
It follows that all topologies in our class are either stronger
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Fig. 3: The minimal topologies for which there exists a protocol such that TimelyDR can be achieved. The channels’ labels
denote whether the channels are default (d), reliable (r), or undeniable (u). The nodes’ lines denote whether the roles are
untrusted (circled once), trusted (circled twice), or partially trusted (dashed circles), where a partially trusted P is of type
trustFwd and a partially trusted Auth is of type trustRpl.
than one of the topologies T1, . . . , T7 and, by Lemma 1, also
also establish TimelyDR with some protocol or they are weaker
than one of the topologies T1, . . . , T7 and thus do not meet
the necessary requirements for TimelyDR.
The theorem shows that strong assumptions are indeed
necessary to achieve timeliness for dispute resolution. In
particular, unreliable channels are insufficient. In most cases,
undeniable channels or trusted platforms are required. This can
only be avoided in those topologies where there are reliable
paths both from the voters to the authority and back. Moreover,
TimelyDR cannot hold when the platforms are untrusted. This
generalizes [2], which states that dispute resolution (called
contestability in [2]) cannot hold in poll-site voting protocols
where ballot-marking devices can be corrupted.
Recall that, in our protocol class, we also allow for off-
line devices D. Our analysis shows that D is irrelevant for
the question of whether or not TimelyDR can be achieved.
Also, it is irrelevant whether the channels between the voters
and the authority are authentic, confidential, or secure. In
particular, they can all be insecure. Nevertheless such devices
and channels are needed in voting to satisfy other properties,
for example privacy.
VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PRACTICE
We now give a practical interpretation of the above results
and illustrate how our formalism can be used.
A. Topologies providing TimelyDR
Consider the topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3. In T1, there
is an undeniable channel from P to Auth. When the platforms
are physical ballot boxes, this can be interpreted as the
assumption that sufficiently many witnesses see all ballots in
the boxes and observe that they are forwarded and considered
in the tallying process. The undeniable channel between H
and P in T2 could, for example, model that witnesses at each
polling station observe voters’ attempts to cast their ballot,
e.g., by scanning their already encrypted ballot on a voting
machine [33]. The trusted P in T3 models, for example, that
everyone trusts the voting machines used to compute and cast
ballots. In this case, the machines can store a trustworthy
record of what ballots have been cast for dispute resolution.
In topology T4, the paths from H to Auth as well as from
Auth to H are reliable. P and Auth are respectively trusted to
forward and reply. In a remote setting, the reliable channel
from H to P could model that voters can always successfully
enter messages on their platforms, for example on a working
keyboard. The voters could try with several platforms [39]
to cast their ballot remotely and receive a confirmation from
Auth or, in the worst case, go to a physical polling station
to do so. The assumptions then model that the voters can
find a working platform and website (e.g., public platforms in
libraries, polling places, etc.) or they can find a polling station
that issues them with a valid confirmation before the election
closes. In T5 and T6, the undeniable channels could model a
distributed ledger on which everyone can respectively observe
when confirmations are issued or ballots are cast. Finally, T7
could model a remote setting similar to T4, but where ballots
are cast by the trusted platforms.
B. Resolving dispute D2 in protocols without re-voting
In practice, the properties VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth)
can be established in a protocol that provides evidence that
a ballot was received by Auth. For example, this can be
achieved by an undeniable channel or by a confirmation that
is sent back from Auth to the voter upon a ballot’s receipt.
Faulty(Auth, b) can then be defined as the set of traces where
a ballot b was received by Auth but is not in the set of recorded
ballots on the bulletin board (see Section VI-D for a concrete
example). In contrast, it is often unclear how VoterA(Auth)
can be established as a voter who abstains cannot prove the
absence of a message. To solve this issue, we show that
VoterA(Auth) is, in many cases, entailed by the Uniqueness
property, defined next, that can be achieved using standard
techniques. We prove this for protocols without re-voting and
assume such protocols in the rest of this section.
Uniqueness(Auth) states that whenever any recorded ballots
are published and Auth is not considered dishonest according
to Faulty(Auth, b) for some b 6=⊥, then each recorded ballot
b′ has been sent by a unique eligible voter H for which
castBy(b′) = H . Thereby, the ballot can be sent as part of a
larger composed message. To express that a message m′ is a
subterm of another message m, we write m ` m′. As everyone
can evaluate Faulty(Auth, b), the property’s preconditions and
thus Uniqueness(Auth) are verifiable by everyone.
Definition 7. Let the length of the list [b] be n.
Uniqueness(Auth) := {tr | b 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b)
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} =⇒
∃[H], i′, j′, A1, A2,m1,m2. BBH([H]) ∈ tr
∧castBy([b]i) = [H]i′ ∧ castBy([b]j) = [H]j′
∧send([H]i′ , A1,m1) ∈ tr ∧ send([H]j′ , A2,m2) ∈ tr
∧m1 ` [b]i ∧m2 ` [b]j ∧ (i 6= j =⇒ [H]i′ 6= [H]j′)}.
The property’s guarantees are similar to eligibility verifiabil-
ity [26] in that both state that each element of a list on the
bulletin board is associated with a unique eligible voter and
we compare the two notions in more detail in Appendix C3.
Note that the property can only hold for protocols where the
list of eligible voters is publicly known.
Intuitively, if a protocol satisfies Uniqueness(Auth), then a
ballot recorded for the voter H implies that H cast it. Thus, for
any ballot that was not cast by H , Auth cannot convincingly
claim the contrary and an honest voter is thus protected in
disputes D2. In particular, the traces in the protocol also satisfy
VoterA(Auth). We prove the following theorem in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let Pr be a protocol in our class without re-voting
and where a voter who abstains does not send any message
and let T be a topology in our class.
∀tr ∈ TR(Pr, T ).
tr ∈ Uniqueness(Auth) =⇒ tr ∈ VoterA(Auth).
The theorem has the practical application that, while it is
often unclear how VoterA(Auth) can be directly realized,
Uniqueness(Auth) can easily be achieved using standard tech-
niques, such as voters signing their ballots. We provide an
example in Section VI-D.
C. How to use our formalism
Given the above results, our formalism can be used to
analyze whether a protocol Pr and topology T in our class
of voting protocols satisfy all dispute resolution properties
introduced in Section IV. If there is no topology T1, . . . , T7 in
Figure 3, such that Ti v T , then we can immediately conclude,
by Theorem 1, that TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) cannot
hold while the protocol is also functional. Otherwise, analysis
is required whether the properties are indeed satisfied by Pr.
First, let Pr be a protocol that defines a dispute resolution
procedure, i.e., specifies the set Faulty. Our formalism is
mainly intended for this case and can directly be used to
analyze whether VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth), VoterA(Auth),
and AuthP(Auth) hold in such a protocol. In protocols without
re-voting that satisfy Uniqueness(Auth) and the precondi-
tions of Theorem 2, VoterA(Auth) can also be proven by
proving Uniqueness(Auth) and concluding VoterA(Auth) by
Theorem 2.
If a protocol Pr does not define a dispute resolution pro-
cedure Faulty then our properties are also undefined. Never-
theless, one can still try to define a verdict Faulty using the
protocol’s specified signals BB, Ev, and Pub and the terms
contained in these signals. Our formalism can then be used to
establish for each such Faulty which properties are satisfied.
However, to prove that no definition of Faulty achieves dispute
resolution, all possible combinations and relations of the above
signals and their terms must be considered. Thus, it is in
general not straightforward to efficiently conclude that no
appropriate definition of Faulty exists for a given protocol.
D. A mixnet-based voting protocol with dispute resolution
To demonstrate the applicability of our formalism, we next
analyze MixVote, a standard mixnet-based voting protocol
inspired by [5] with a dispute resolution procedure similar
to [30]. In particular, we show how Faulty is instantiated,
how the properties VoterC(Auth) and TimelyP(Auth) differ in
practice, and that our dispute resolution properties are compat-
ible with standard voting properties, such as verifiability and
receipt-freeness. Due to space constraints, we only describe the
protocol’s main features here, omitting some details such as
the auditor’s role and the precise definition of some functions
and equations in the term algebra. For the detailed protocol
specification, the properties’ formal definitions, and the proofs
we refer to Appendix C
1) Topology: We consider a topology TMV that is as T4 in
Figure 3d, except that there is also a trusted off-line device D,
which is connected to the voter H by (bidirectional) secure,
default channels. TMV specifies reliable channels between H
and the platform P and between P and the authority Auth.
Also, P and Auth are partially trusted to forward messages
and reply to messages, respectively. Thus, by Theorem 1, it is
possible to achieve TimelyDR in the topology TMV.
2) Protocol: We present the protocol as a message sequence
chart, where each role is depicted by a vertical life line
and where the box on top names the role. A role’s life line
denotes the role’s events, ordered sequentially. A role’s sent
and received messages are depicted on top of arrows that start
at the sender and end at the recipient. Also, we denote explicit
signals by solid squares and the roles’ internal computations
by dashed squares.
MixVote’s simplified specification is depicted in Figure 4.
The protocol’s setup specifies that at each point in time, only
one election takes place (i.e., there are no parallel sessions) and
each voter possesses a unique trusted device D to which he
has exclusive access. All devices are equipped with a unique
signing key skD and the authority with a unique secret key
skAuth. The corresponding verification keys from the devices
[pkD] are known to Auth and Auth’s public key pkAuth is known
to all devices. Moreover, all these public keys are published
D H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈D,P,BB, v〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth, [pkD]〉)
knows(BB, 〈Auth, [pkD], pkAuth, [H]〉)knows(D, 〈H,Auth, pkAuth, skD〉) knows(P, 〈H,Auth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpkD([pkD]),BBpk(pkAuth)
BBH([H]),Corr([H, pkD])
v
b = encrypt v under pkAuth
and sign result with skD
b
Ballot(H, b)
b b
If valid, add b to [b]
{b}skAuth{b}skAuth
Ev(b, {b}skAuth) [v] = Tally([b])
[b], [v]
BBrec([b]),BBtal([v])
End
[b]
verifyC(H, b)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |(∃[b], pkAuth, c. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr ∧ Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b])
∨(∃[b], [pkD]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ not all ballots in [b] contain a signature associated with a unique key in [pkD])}
Fig. 4: Simplified protocol specification for MixVote, without the auditor role and the full function definitions. Here pkD =
pk(skD), pkAuth = pk(skAuth), and castBy(b) = H holds iff ∃pk. ver(b, pk) 6=⊥ ∧〈H, pk〉 ∈ [H, pk] ∧ Corr([H, pk]) ∈ tr . The
protocol’s setup specifies a single agent Auth, that each voter H is associated with a unique trusted off-line device D, and
that there is no restriction on the relation between voters H and platforms P . The role for a voter H who abstains consists of
receiving the list of recorded ballots from the bulletin board followed by the signal verifyA(H, ∅).
on BB (denoted by the signals BBpkD and BBpk, respectively).
Additionally, at the protocol’s start BB knows and publishes
the list of eligible voters [H] (denoted by the signal BBH)
and which verification key corresponds to which voter. The
latter is denoted by the signal Corr([H, pkD]), where each pair
〈H, pkD〉 in the list denotes that the signing key corresponding
to pkD is installed on H’s device.
To vote, a voter H uses his device D to compute the
ballot as follows: the vote is encrypted under Auth’s public
key and signed by the device. Then, the voter casts his ballot
by entering it on any platform P , which forwards it over the
network to Auth. For each received ballot b, Auth checks b’s
validity, namely whether b contains a signature corresponding
to an eligible voter who has not previously voted. If this is the
case, Auth adds b to the list of recorded ballots [b]. Moreover,
as in other protocols [30], to achieve dispute resolution, Auth
sends back a confirmation to the voter H . The confirmation
consists of H’s ballot b signed by Auth and serves as evidence
that b was indeed received by the authority. The voter keeps
this confirmation as evidence for later disputes (indicated by
the signal Ev).
After the voting phase, Auth computes the tally from the
recorded ballots [b]. For this, a standard mixnet is used to
decrypt the ballots. This procedure has the properties that
no one can learn the correspondence between the encrypted
ballots and the decrypted votes. Nevertheless, the mixnet
produces evidence, which is published by Auth on the bulletin
board, that allows everyone to verify that the tally was
computed correctly. We describe the detailed functions and
equations modeling the Tally function in Appendix C1. Also,
we describe there the detailed information that is produced by
the mixnet and published on BB and how an auditor inspects
this information to verify the tally.
Among other information, Auth publishes on BB the
recorded ballots [b] and the votes in the final tally [v], as shown
in Figure 4. This allows a voter to read the recorded ballots
on BB and verify that his ballot is included in this list.
A voter who abstains does not send any messages. After the
results are published, he reads the list of recorded ballots [b] on
BB and believes at that step that no ballot should be recorded
for him, which is denoted by the signal verifyA(H, ∅).
We complete the protocol’s specification with the definitions
of the function castBy and the dispute resolution procedure
Faulty. castBy specifies that a ballot b is considered to be
cast by the voter H if the ballot’s signature can be verified
with the verification key that is associated with H . Faulty
specifies that Auth is considered dishonest in all traces where
(a) some agent possesses evidence consisting of a ballot b
signed by Auth that is not included in the recorded ballots [b]
on the bulletin board or (b) not all published recorded ballots
[b] contain a signature of a unique eligible voter. castBy is
defined in Figure 4’s caption and the description of Faulty is
given in Figure 4, although we omit here the details of how
we model (b).
3) Dispute resolution: Intuitively, by the channel and trust
assumptions, each voter who casts a ballot b receives, be-
fore the election’s end, a confirmation. As this confirmation
serves as evidence that b must be on BB, VoterC(Auth) and
TimelyP(Auth) hold. Furthermore, since no one can forge
Auth’s signature, for a ballot b that was not actually received by
Auth no one can produce (false) evidence that b should be on
BB. Thus, Auth cannot be falsely convicted and AuthP(Auth)
holds too. Moreover, Uniqueness(Auth) holds because, when
Faulty does not hold in an execution, all recorded ballots are
signed (and thus were sent) by a unique eligible voter. In
particular, Uniqueness(Auth) implies VoterA(Auth) in MixVote.
To understand the difference between VoterC(Auth) and
TimelyP(Auth), take a topology T ′MV equal to TMV except that
Auth is untrusted. Assume for simplicity that a voter can
interpret whether Auth’s signature on the confirmation is valid.
In reality, this would require an additional protocol step where
the voter uses a device. When the protocol is run in T ′MV,
it satisfies VoterC(Auth), as a voter only proceeds with his
verifiability check when he has previously received a valid
confirmation that convinces everyone that his ballot must be
recorded. However, TimelyP(Auth) is violated as Auth may
never reply with a valid confirmation and thus block a voter.
Consequently, there is an unresolved dispute where an outside
observer cannot tell whether a voter did not cast a ballot or the
authority did not send a confirmation. In contrast, when the
protocol is run in topology TMV, Auth always sends a timely
response and such disputes do not occur.
4) Standard voting properties: In addition to the dispute
resolution properties, we prove in Appendix C that MixVote
satisfies end-to-end verifiability, consisting of individual verifi-
ability and tallied-as-recorded, as well as eligibility verifiabil-
ity [26]. Tallied-as-recorded and eligibility verifiability are two
universal verifiability properties that respectively denote that
an auditor can verify that the recorded ballots are correctly
counted in the final tally and that each vote in the final
tally was cast by a unique eligible voter. We also prove that
MixVote satisfies receipt-freeness [18], which denotes that a
voter cannot prove to the adversary how he voted, even when
he provides the adversary with all secrets that he knows.
Intuitively, receipt-freeness holds because the adversary cannot
access the voter’s device D. Moreover, the evidence used
for disputes only contains the ballot and does not reveal the
underlying (encrypted) vote.
5) Proofs: We prove in Appendix C4 and by the Tamarin
files in [35] that MixVote satisfies all above mentioned proper-
ties when run in the topology TMV. In particular, we establish
most of the properties by automatically proving them for
one voter who casts a ballot in Tamarin and by proving
them for an arbitrary number of voters by pen-and-paper
proofs. The only exceptions are: receipt-freeness, which we
prove by Tamarin’s built in support for observational equiv-
alence [3]; VoterA(Auth), which we deduce (by hand) from
Uniqueness(Auth) using Theorem 2; and end-to-end verifia-
bility which we deduce (by hand) from individual verifiability
and tallied-as-recorded.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Dispute resolution in poll-site voting protocols
The idea of dispute resolution has been informally con-
sidered for poll-site voting protocols. In [17], the property
considered is called non-repudiation and requires that failures
“can not only be detected, but (in most cases) demonstrated”
and that no false convictions can be made. [2] informally
considers the properties contestability and defensibility, which
are similar to our dispute resolution properties in that they also
protect the honest voters and the honest authority. Contesta-
bility requires that some guarantees hold for a voter when he
starts the voting process at a polling station. In contrast, our
properties TimelyP(Auth) and VoterC(Auth) are also suitable
for remote settings and respectively make guarantees once a
voter casts his ballot and believes that it should be recorded.
Moreover, [2]’s definitions are informal and they do not
consider timeliness.
In most poll-site voting protocols that consider dispute
resolution, voters receive a confirmation as evidence that their
ballot was accepted by the authority [7], [10], [11], [13], [17],
[24], [38]. In some protocols [10], [17], this confirmation
contains the authority’s digital signature. In the protocols based
on Scantegrity [11], [13], [24], [38] the confirmation consists
of a code that is (physically) hidden on the ballot by invisible
ink and revealed when a voter marks his choice. A voter’s
knowledge of a valid code serves as evidence that he voted
for a candidate. Thus, when a wrong ballot is recorded, a voter
can prove the authority’s dishonesty by revealing the code.
Compared to remote voting settings, poll-site protocols
profit from the fact that on-site witnesses can observe certain
actions. For example, if voters are repeatedly prevented from
casting their ballots, this is visible to other voters and auditors
in the polling station. Some protocols [24] even explicitly
state that voters should publicly declare some decisions be-
fore entering them on the voting machine to avoid disputes
regarding whether the voting machine correctly followed their
instructions. Our notion of undeniable channels allows one to
formally consider such assumptions during protocol analysis.
B. Dispute resolution in remote voting protocols
Remotegrity [39] is a remote voting protocol based on
Scantegrity, where paper sheets are sent to the voters by
postal mail and ballots are cast over the Internet. As with
Scantegrity II and III [11], [13], [38], to achieve dispute
resolution some codes on these sheets are obscured by a
scratch-off surface. If a voter detects a (valid) ballot that is
incorrectly recorded for him, he can show to anyone that he
has not yet scratched off the relevant codes on his sheets and
thus the authority must have falsely recorded this ballot.
[39] discusses several dispute scenarios with respect to
whether a ballot is recorded correctly. However, it is stated
that “The [authority] can always force a denial-of-service [..]
What Remotegrity does not allow is the [authority] to fully
accept (i.e., accept and lock) any ballot the voter did not cast
without the voter being able to dispute it.” Thus, the focus is
on disputes D2 in Figure 2, while timeliness in disputes D1
is not further explored. Moreover, the considered properties
as well as the assumed setting are not specified precisely and
thus the properties cannot be proven. In contrast, our model
enables specifying detailed adversary and system assumptions
and provides definitions of dispute resolution properties that
can be formally analyzed.
C. Accountability
Our dispute resolution properties are closely related to
different notions of accountability [9], [27], [28]. Both ac-
countability and our properties formalize how misbehaving
protocol participants are identified. While the accountability
definitions are generic and allow one to blame different
agents in different situations, we focus on understanding what
disputes and properties are relevant for voting.
Two accountability definitions have been instantiated for
voting protocols. First, accountability due to Küsters et al. [28]
was instantiated for Bingo Voting [8] in [28], for Helios [1]
in [29], and for sElect [30]. These instantiated notions of
accountability state that when a defined goal is violated, then
some (dishonest) agents can be blamed by a judge. A judge
may blame multiple parties. As a result, in [29] accountability
does not guarantee an unambiguous verdict when a voter
claims that his ballot is incorrectly recorded. That is, the
property does not guarantee the resolution of such disputes
even when the voter is honest. The same holds in [28] and [30]
for disputes where a voter claims that he did not receive
a required confirmation. To avoid ambiguous verdicts, [28]
proposes an alternative accountability property where voters’
claims that they did not receive a required confirmation are
just ignored. However, this property does not guarantee that
the authority is blamed in all situations where an (honest)
voter’s ballot is not recorded correctly and dispute resolution
does not hold.
Second, accountability due to Bruni et al. [9] has been
instantiated for Bingo Voting in [9]. In this work, account-
ability tests decide whether a given agent should be blamed.
However, the accountability test takes as input a ballot and a
confirmation that the voter received when casting his ballot.
Thus disputes where a voter claims that he cannot receive a
confirmation are not considered at all.
In contrast to these two accountability notions, we also
consider and resolve disputes where a voter claims that he
did not receive a required response from Auth after casting
the ballot by the property TimelyP(Auth). Moreover, our
topology characterization allows us to quickly assess when
given assumptions are insufficient to satisfy TimelyP(Auth).
D. Other related properties
Collection accountability [6] states that when a vote is in-
correctly collected, the voter should be provided with evidence
to convince an “independent party” that this is the case, but
it has neither been formally defined nor analyzed. Dispute
freeness [34] states that there is never a dispute. This property
is considered in voting protocols where voters are modeled
as machines that conduct an election by engaging in a multi-
party protocol [37], [25] and is thus inappropriate for large
scale elections where voters must be assumed to have limited
computational capabilities. Finally, the FOO protocol [21]
allows voters to claim that something went wrong. However,
without additional assumptions, FOO does not satisfy our
dispute resolution properties. In particular, the signed ballot
a voter receives does not prove that the counter, who is
responsible for tallying, has received the ballot.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Dispute resolution is an essential ingredient for trustworthy
elections and worthy of a careful, formal treatment. Based
on a systematic analysis of disputes, we proposed new dis-
pute resolution properties and introduced timeliness as an
important aspect thereof. We fully characterized all topologies
that achieve timeliness. This provides a formal account for
the intuition that timeliness requires strong assumptions. For
example, it is not achievable in standard remote voting settings
where a network adversary can simply drop messages.
While we have focused on necessary assumptions for dis-
pute resolution, in real elections there are other properties,
notably privacy, which may require other assumptions. As
future work, we would like to investigate how our topology
hierarchy must be adapted for these properties and to char-
acterize the required assumptions for them. The combination
of such results with our characterization could lead to new
insights about the possibility of achieving different properties
simultaneously. Furthermore, such combined results could be a
starting point to identify the topologies enabling all properties
required in voting; this would help in election design to
quickly assess the minimal required setups.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs from Section V
We present additional proofs and lemmas for proving the
claims from Section V.
1) Topology hierarchy: To prove Lemma 1, we will argue
that if two traces or two sets of traces are “similar enough”,
then they either both satisfy our considered dispute resolution
properties or both violate them. To help with this reasoning,
we first define a notion of similarity and show two auxiliary
lemmas.
Definition 8. Two traces tr1 and tr2 are dispute resolution
equal, denoted by DRequal(tr1, tr2), iff for any voter H and
ballot b and for the authority Auth it holds that
(∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 . tr1 = tr ′1 · tr ′′1 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′1 ∧ End ∈ tr ′′1
⇔
∃tr ′2, tr ′′2 . tr2 = tr ′2 · tr ′′2 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′2 ∧ End ∈ tr ′′2)
∧(hon(Auth) ∈ tr1 ⇔ hon(Auth) ∈ tr2)
∧(pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2)).
The set of traces TR(Pr1, T1) is dispute resolution
similar to the set of traces TR(Pr2, T2), denoted by
DRsimilar(TR(Pr1, T1),TR(Pr2, T2)), iff
∀adv ∈ {Auth+H+,Auth+,H+}, tr1 ∈ TR(Pr1, T adv1 ).
∃tr2 ∈ TR(Pr2, T adv2 ). DRequal(tr1, tr2).
The following auxiliary lemma states that when two
traces are dispute resolution equal, then either both satisfy
TimelyP(Auth), respectively AuthP(Auth), or both do not sat-
isfy it.
Lemma 2. For two traces tr1 and tr2, where
DRequal(tr1, tr2), it holds that
(tr1 ∈ TimelyP(Auth)⇔ tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth))
∧(tr1 ∈ AuthP(Auth)⇔ tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth)).
Proof. We prove each of the conjuncts separately. Consider
two traces tr1 and tr2 such that DRequal(tr1, tr2). By Defi-
nition 2, TimelyP(Auth) holds in a trace tr iff
∀H, b. ∃tr ′, tr ′′. tr = tr ′ · tr ′′ ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′
∧End ∈ tr ′′ =⇒ (∃[b]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b])
∨(tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b)).
This formula is of the form
∀H, b. ∃tr ′, tr ′′.
A(H, b, tr ′, tr ′′) =⇒ B(H, b, tr ′, tr ′′) ∨ C(H, b).
In the following we refer to these predicates simply by A,
B, and C. As only the truth values of the predicates A and
B depend on the traces tr ′ and tr ′′, we consider the formula
(∃tr ′, tr ′′. A =⇒ B) ∨ C, which we will call F , and show
that it holds for exactly the same H and b in tr1 and tr2.
Concretely, we show that if F holds for a given H and b in tr1,
then it also holds for H and b in tr2. As DRequal(tr1, tr2) is
symmetric, the same arguments can be applied to show that if
F holds for a given H and b in tr2, then it also holds in tr1. As
this holds for all H and b, it follows that tr1 ∈ TimelyP(Auth)
iff tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth).
Let H and b be such that F holds in tr1. We make a case
distinction for the different truth values of A, B, and C.
Case 1): Let H and b be such that (∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 . A =⇒
B) does not hold in tr1. As by assumption F holds, it must
be the case that C holds, that is tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b). By
Definition 8, pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2) and by Requirement 1
pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2) implies that tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) iff
tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b). Thus, tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) and C also
holds in tr2 for H and b. It follows that F holds in tr2 for
H and b.
Case 2): Let H and b be such that (∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 . A =⇒ B)
holds in tr1, and A holds and B holds. That is, H and b are
such that there exist two traces tr ′1 and tr
′′
1 , where
tr1 = tr
′
1 · tr ′′1 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′1 ∧ End ∈ tr ′′1
and such that there exists a list of ballots [b] for which
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′1 ∧ b ∈ [b].
By Definition 8, there also exist two traces tr12 and tr
2
2, such
that
tr2 = tr
1
2 · tr22 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr12 ∧ End ∈ tr22.
Moreover, by Definition 8, pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2). As BBrec
is a signal in the publicly observable trace and as BBrec([b])
with b ∈ [b] is recorded before End in tr1, it holds that for
two traces tr32 and tr
4
2
tr = tr32 · tr42 ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr32 ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr42.
Thus, as both the signals Ballot(H, b) and BBrec([b]) are
recorded in tr2 before End there exist two traces tr ′2 and tr
′′
2
(where tr ′2 can be chosen to be the larger trace from tr
1
2 and
tr32) such that
tr2 = tr
′
2 · tr ′′2 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′2 ∧ End ∈ tr ′′2
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′2 ∧ b ∈ [b].
Hence, (∃tr ′2, tr ′′2 . A =⇒ B) also holds in tr2 and F is
satisfied for H and b.
Case 3): Let H and b be such that (∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 . A =⇒ B)
holds in tr1 and A does not hold. That is,
∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 . ¬(tr1 = tr ′1 ·tr ′′1 ∧Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′1∧End ∈ tr ′′1).
We choose tr ′2 = tr
′′
2 = ∅ and it holds that
¬(tr2 = tr ′2 · tr ′′2 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′2 ∧ End ∈ tr ′′2).
In particular, empty traces cannot contain a signal, thus the
second and third conjunct are always false. Thus, it follows
that
∃tr ′2, tr ′′2 . ¬(tr2 = tr ′2 · tr ′′2 ∧Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′2∧End ∈ tr ′′2)
and hence A is false in tr2. It follows that (∃tr ′2, tr ′′2 . A =⇒
B) and therefore F hold in tr2 for H and b.
Hence, we showed that in all cases where F holds for a H
and b in tr1, F also holds for H and b in tr2.
We next prove the lemma’s second conjunct. Assume
two traces tr1 and tr2 such that DRequal(tr1, tr2) and
assume tr1 ∈ AuthP(Auth). We show that this implies
tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth). As DRequal is symmetric, the same
arguments can be applied to show that tr1 ∈ AuthP(Auth)
follows from tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth).
We distinguish two cases for which tr1 ∈ AuthP(Auth).
First, let hon(Auth) /∈ tr1. Definition 8 implies hon(Auth) /∈
tr2, as hon(Auth) ∈ tr2 would require hon(Auth) ∈ tr1,
which is a contradiction. From hon(Auth) /∈ tr2, it follows that
tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth) by Definition 4. Second, let hon(Auth) ∈
tr1 and assume that it holds for all ballots b that tr1 /∈
Faulty(Auth, b). Definition 8 implies hon(Auth) ∈ tr2. More-
over, by Definition 8 it holds that pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2)
and, by Requirement 1, pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2) implies
that tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) iff tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b). Thus,
it cannot hold that there exists a ballot b for which tr2 ∈
Faulty(Auth, b), as this would require tr1 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b),
which is a contradiction. We thus conclude that for all ballots
b, tr2 /∈ Faulty(Auth, b), and thus by Definition 4 tr2 ∈
AuthP(Auth).
Using the above lemma, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For two sets of traces TR(Pr1, T1) and TR(Pr2, T2),
where DRsimilar(TR(Pr1, T1),TR(Pr2, T2)), it holds that
TR(Pr2, T Auth
+H+
2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr2, TH+2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr2, T Auth+2 ) ⊆ AuthP(Auth) =⇒
TR(Pr1, T Auth
+H+
1 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr1, TH+1 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr1, T Auth+1 ) ⊆ AuthP(Auth).
Proof. Assume that
TR(Pr2, T Auth
+H+
2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr2, TH+2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr2, T Auth+2 ) ⊆ AuthP(Auth)
and that DRsimilar(TR(Pr1, T1),TR(Pr2, T2)).
Let tr1 be a trace in TR(Pr1, T Auth
+H+
1 ). By Defini-
tion 8, there exists a trace tr2 in TR(Pr2, T Auth
+H+
2 ) such
that DRequal(tr1, tr2). By Lemma 2, it holds that tr1 ∈
TimelyP(Auth) ⇔ tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth) and tr1 ∈
AuthP(Auth) ⇔ tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth). Since, by assumption,
TR(Pr2, T Auth
+H+
2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth) and thus
tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth), it follows that tr1 ∈
TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth). As tr1 is an arbitrary trace
in TR(Pr1, T Auth
+H+
1 ), it follows that TR(Pr1, T
Auth+H+
1 ) ⊆
TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth).
Let tr1 be a trace in TR(Pr1, TH
+
1 ). By Definition 8,
there exists a trace tr2 in TR(Pr2, TH
+
2 ) such that
DRequal(tr1, tr2). By Lemma 2, it holds that tr1 ∈
TimelyP(Auth) ⇔ tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth). Since, by as-
sumption, TR(Pr2, TH
+
2 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) and thus tr2 ∈
TimelyP(Auth), it follows that tr1 ∈ TimelyP(Auth). As
tr1 is an arbitrary trace in TR(Pr1, TH
+
1 ), it follows that
TR(Pr1, TH
+
1 ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth).
Finally, let tr1 be a trace in TR(Pr1, T Auth
+
1 ). By Def-
inition 8, there exists a trace tr2 in TR(Pr2, T Auth
+
2 ) such
that DRequal(tr1, tr2). By Lemma 2, it holds that tr1 ∈
AuthP(Auth) ⇔ tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth). Since, by assumption,
TR(Pr2, T Auth
+
2 ) ⊆ AuthP(Auth) and thus tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth),
it follows that tr1 ∈ AuthP(Auth). As tr1 is an arbitrary
trace in TR(Pr1, T Auth
+
1 ), it follows that TR(Pr1, T
Auth+
1 ) ⊆
AuthP(Auth).
Using the above lemmas, we next prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. We define T1 @ T2 := T1 v T2∧T1 6= T2.
Let TS = (VS , ES , tS , cS), TI = (VI , EI , tI , cI), and
TI v TS and let Pr be an arbitrary protocol such that
TimelyDR(Pr, TI). By Definition 5, TimelyDR(Pr, TI) =
TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+
I ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth)
∧TR(Pr, TH+I ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∧TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I ) ⊆
AuthP(Auth) ∧TR(Pr, T Auth+H+I )∩Func 6= ∅. For two
channel or trust types xI and xS , we say that xS is minimally
stronger than xI iff xI @ xS ∧ ¬∃xM . xI @ xM @ xS .
We say that two topologies differ by one attribute in the
following cases: one topology contains exactly one channel
or role that does not exist in the other, a role that occurs in
both topologies has a minimally stronger trust type in one of
the topologies, or a channel that occurs in both topologies has
a minimally stronger channel type in one of the topologies.
We distinguish three cases how TI and TS , where TI v TS ,
relate: (1) the topologies are equal, (2) they differ only by
one attribute, and (3) they differ by several attributes. Case
(1), where TS = TI , is trivial and we look at the other cases.
Case (2): TI @ TS ∧ ¬∃TM . TI @ TM @ TS .
TS can differ from TI (i) because there is one more (default
and insecure) channel or (untrusted) role, (ii) because one of
the channel types is stronger, or (iii) because one of the trust
types is stronger. We further distinguish between these three
cases in (2i)–(2iii).
Case (2i): (∃(va, vb).(va, vb) ∈ ES ∧ (va, vb) /∈ EI ∧
cS(va, vb) = ◦ d−→◦) ∨ (∃v.v ∈ ES ∧ v /∈ EI ∧ tS(v) =
untrusted).
By assumption, TimelyDR(Pr, TI). Assume that Pr only
makes use of the vertices and edges in TI . This is without
loss of generality because otherwise we can define a protocol
Pr′, which is as Pr but does not make use of the vertices and
edges not contained in TI and for which TimelyDR(Pr′, TI).
We argue that the traces resulting from Pr run in TS are
dispute resolution similar to the traces resulting from Pr run
in TI , i.e., DRsimilar(TR(Pr, TS),TR(Pr, TI)). First, when Pr
is run in TS , the honest agents follow the protocol and never
send or receive anything on (va, vb). Second, when va is
under the adversary’s control, the adversary can send messages
on (va, vb). However, the adversary sending messages on an
insecure channel does not change the fact that the resulting
set of traces is dispute resolution similar to the original
set TR(Pr, TI) (it does not change the publicly observable
trace, nor the signals Ballot, End, and hon). Moreover, when
vb is honest, it ignores all incoming messages and when
vb is controlled by the adversary too, her knowledge does
not differ compared to when the channel (va, vb) does not
exist. Thus, the adversary cannot learn, construct, and send
messages that were not possible in TR(Pr, TI). Finally, as
the protocol does not specify any behavior for role v, no
honest agent will instantiate this role and, as there is no initial
knowledge specified for v, the adversary cannot learn any
new messages even if she simulates such a role. We conclude
that DRsimilar(TR(Pr, TS),TR(Pr, TI)) and thus, by Lemma 3
and TimelyDR(Pr, TI), it follows that TR(Pr, TS) satisfies
TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) in the required adversary
models.
Moreover, the trace that satisfies Func in TR(Pr, TI) (by as-
sumption such a trace exists) also satisfies Func in TR(Pr, TS),
as the same trace is valid even when there is an additional
(unused) channel or role.
Case (2ii): ∃(va, vb) ∈ EI .cI(va, vb) v cS(va, vb).
We consider the following cases how a channel in TS is
minimally stronger than the same channel in TI .
(a) ∃x. x ∈ {d, r, u}
∧ cS(va, vb) = • x−→• ∧ cI(va, vb) = • x−→◦
(b) ∃x. x ∈ {d, r, u}
∧ cS(va, vb) = • x−→• ∧ cI(va, vb) = ◦ x−→•
(c) ∃x. x ∈ {d, r, u}
∧ cS(va, vb) = • x−→◦ ∧ cI(va, vb) = ◦ x−→◦
(d) ∃x. x ∈ {d, r, u}
∧ cS(va, vb) = ◦ x−→• ∧ cI(va, vb) = ◦ x−→◦
(e) ∃ −→ . −→∈ {•−→•, •−→◦, ◦−→•, ◦−→◦}
∧ cS(va, vb) = r−→ ∧ cI(va, vb) = d−→
(f) ∃ −→ . −→∈ {•−→•, •−→◦, ◦−→•, ◦−→◦}
∧ cS(va, vb) = u−→ ∧ cI(va, vb) = r−→
We first discuss Cases (a)–(e) and then separately consider the
Case (f).
We first argue that for all traces tr and topologies TI and
TS as described by one of the Cases (a)–(e), it holds that
DRsimilar(TR(Pr, TS), TR(Pr, TI)). This holds as even if the
adversary has full control over a channel, she can always
behave according to the protocol and not send additional
messages, change messages, or reuse messages. Also, she can
always deliver messages correctly even on channels that are
not reliable. Therefore, the adversary on a weaker channel can
perform at least everything that she can on a stronger channel
and moreover, the same behavior on a weaker channel does
not change any of the signals that are relevant for dispute
resolution similarity. We thus conclude by Lemma 3 and by
the assumption that TimelyDR(Pr, TI) that TR(Pr, TS) satisfies
TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) in the required adversary
models.
It remains to show, that Pr also satisfies the functional
property, i.e., ∃tr . tr ∈ TR(Pr, TI)∩Func =⇒ ∃tr ′. tr ′ ∈
TR(Pr, TS)∩Func. By assumption, the same agents are honest
in TI and TS . Thus, the same behavior as in tr can be
simulated in tr ′. Also, on all channels, the adversary only
forwards the messages in tr . As ∀(va, vb). (va, vb) ∈ EI =⇒
(va, vb) ∈ ES , the same is possible in TS , thus the same
messages can be sent and the same signals are produced.
Therefore, TR(Pr, TS)∩Func 6= ∅ as required.
Finally, we consider the Case (f) separately. TS and TI are
equal except that (va, vb) is additionally undeniable in TS .
Thus, the same messages can be sent and received with both
topologies and the only difference is that if the protocol Pr
uses the channel (va, vb), then, for some m, Pub(va, vb,m) is
additionally recorded in the traces in TR(Pr, TS) in contrast
to the traces in TR(Pr, TI). Let Pr be the protocol such that
TimelyDR(Pr, TI) (which exists by assumption) and FaultyI
be the verdict defined as part of Pr. First, consider a ballot b
such that the verdict whether a trace trP is in FaultyI(Auth, b)
does not depend on whether or not Pub(va, vb,m) ∈ trP .
∀adv ∈ {Auth+H+,H+,Auth+}, trS ∈ TR(Pr, T advS ).
∃tr I ∈ TR(Pr, T advI ).
tr I ∈ FaultyI(Auth, b)⇔ trS ∈ FaultyI(Auth, b)
(1)
=⇒∀adv ∈ {Auth+H+,H+,Auth+}, trS ∈ TR(Pr, T advS ).
∃tr I ∈ TR(Pr, T advI ).
(tr I ∈ TimelyP(Auth)⇔ trS ∈ TimelyP(Auth))
∧ (tr I ∈ AuthP(Auth)⇔ trS ∈ AuthP(Auth))
(2)
=⇒∀trS ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth+H+S ).
trS ∈ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth)
∧∀trS ∈ TR(Pr, TH+S ). trS ∈ TimelyP(Auth)
∧∀trS ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth+S ). trS ∈ AuthP(Auth).
The traces trS and tr I only differ in the signals Pub(va, vb,m)
which are irrelevant for FaultyI(Auth, b) by assumption. Next,
the only way the signals Pub(va, vb,m) influence whether
a trace is in TimelyP(Auth) or AuthP(Auth) is if they
change the decision whether the trace is in FaultyI(Auth, b),
which is not the case by assumption (Step (1)). Finally,
Step (2) holds by the assumption that TimelyDR(Pr, TI) and
thus TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+
I ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth) ∧
TR(Pr, TH
+
I ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth) ∧TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I ) ⊆
AuthP(Auth).
Now consider a ballot b for which the verdict whether
trP is in FaultyI(Auth, b) depends on whether or not
Pub(va, vb,m) ∈ trP . We construct a protocol Pr′ that
is as Pr except that the definition of the verdict for such
ballots (that depend on whether or not Pub(va, vb,m) ∈
trP ) is changed. Namely, FaultyS(Auth, b) (in Pr
′) is de-
fined as FaultyI(Auth, b) except that all occurrences of
Pub(va, vb,m) ∈ trP in FaultyI(Auth, b)’s definition are sub-
stituted by false and all occurrences of Pub(va, vb,m) /∈ trP
by true. Then
∀adv ∈ {Auth+H+,H+,Auth+}, trS ∈ TR(Pr′, T advS ).
∃tr I ∈ TR(Pr, T advI ).
tr I ∈ FaultyI(Auth, b)⇔ trS ∈ FaultyS(Auth, b)
as all signals Pub(va, vb,m) that could not influence
FaultyI(Auth, b) (as they did not occur in tr I ), are just ignored
by FaultyS(Auth, b) to simulate the same behavior. We can
apply the same Steps as (1) and (2) above, to conclude that
Pr′ satisfies TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) in the required
adversary models.
It remains to show that the functional property is preserved.
Let tr ∈ TR(Pr, TI)∩Func, which exists by assumption.
Then, there is a trace tr ′ in TR(Pr′, TS) where all agents
behave exactly as in tr , but which might contain additional
signals Pub(va, vb,m) compared to tr . We can conclude that
tr ′ ∈Func as Func only requires that certain signals appear
in the trace and adding more signals does not invalidate the
property.
Case (2iii): ∃v ∈ VI .tI(v) v tS(v). We consider the
following cases:
(a) tS(v) = trusted ∧ tI(v) ∈ {trustFwd, trustRpl}
(b) tS(v) ∈ {trustFwd, trustRpl} ∧ tI(v) = untrusted.
Let Pr be a protocol such that TimelyDR(Pr, TI), which
exists by assumption. We argue that, in both Cases (a) and
(b), TR(Pr, TS) is dispute resolution similar to TR(Pr, TI),
i.e., DRsimilar(TR(Pr, TS),TR(Pr, TI)). For this, we take an
arbitrary trace trS and adversary assumption adv such that
trS ∈ TR(Pr, T advS ) and argue that there exists a trace tr I in
TR(Pr, T advI ), such that DRequal(tr1, tr2).
This is the case as a partially trusted (untrusted) agent in
tr I can always also behave according to the protocol as a
trusted (partially trusted) agent in trS . Thus the traces trS
and tr I denote the same behavior, but may differ in some
signals that are only recorded for honest agents, such as
verifyC. However, all signals BB in trS are equal to those in
tr I (BB is always honest and receives the same messages in
tr I and trS), all signals Ev are equal in trS and tr I (they
can be recorded by untrusted agents), and all signals Pub
are equal in trS and tr I (as the same channels are used).
Thus, pubtr(tr I) = pubtr(trS). Moreover, we never consider
topologies where tS(H) = trusted or tS(Auth) = trusted
for the voter H or the authority Auth thus the signals Ballot
and hon(Auth) are also equal in tr I and trS . We conclude
by Definition 8 that DRequal(tr1, tr2) and by Lemma 3 that
TR(Pr, TS) satisfies TimelyP(Auth) and AuthP(Auth) with the
required adversary models.
Furthermore, it holds that ∃tr . tr ∈ TR(Pr, TI)∩Func =⇒
∃tr ′. tr ′ ∈ TR(Pr, TS)∩Func, as by definition in tr all agents
behave according to the protocol which is a valid behavior
in TS that may however result in additional signals being
recorded in tr ′. However, as additional signals cannot break
the property Func, tr ′ satisfies the functional property.
Case (3): TI @ TS ∧ ∃TM . TI @ TM @ TS .
Let us, step by step and in an arbitrary order, remove one
edge, remove one vertex, weaken one channel assumption, and
weaken one trust assumption at a time in TS until we arrive
at the topology TI . As our topologies are finite, i.e., we only
consider finitely many roles (vertices), channels (edges), trust
types, and channel types, we get a finite sequence of topologies
T1, . . . , Tn for which TI v T1 v . . . v Tn v TS and
where each pair of topologies (TI , T1), (Ti, Ti+1)i∈{1,...,n−1},
and (Tn, TS) only differs in one attribute. By the results
of Case 2, it follows from TI v T1 ∧ TimelyDR(Pr, TI)
that ∃Pr′.TimelyDR(Pr′, T1). We can consecutively apply the
result of Case 2 to conclude from ∃Pr.TimelyDR(Pr, Ti) that
∃Pr′.TimelyDR(Pr′, Ti+1), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. Finally,
we can conclude from Tn v TS ∧ ∃Pr.TimelyDR(Pr, Tn) that
∃Pr′.TimelyDR(Pr′, TS), which concludes the proof.
2) Proof of Theorem 1: Next, we state necessary conditions
for a topology in our voting protocol class to satisfy TimelyDR
with some protocol. Then, we show that these conditions are
also sufficient. We use this, in combination with the topology
hierarchy, to prove Theorem 1 at the end of this section.
Recall from Figure 1 (p. 5) that we distinguish two possible
setups and types of protocols: the setup GS for protocols
where the ballots are cast by the voters and the setup GU ,
where the voters and the platforms are not distinguished, for
protocols that use trusted platforms to cast the ballots. As the
topologies modeling these two setups are incomparable, we
first consider the necessary conditions for topologies T such
that G(T ) ⊆G GS and afterwards for the topologies T such
that G(T ) ⊆G GU . As explained in the proof of Lemma 1,
we use T1 @ T2 := T1 v T2 ∧ T1 6= T2 and sometimes write
T2 6v T1 for T1 @ T2.
a) Necessary conditions for T with G(T ) ⊆G GS: In
order to satisfy the functional property, a necessary require-
ment is the existence of the roles H, P, and Auth and of the
channels (H,P ) and (P,Auth). This is the case as H must
cast a ballot, P must forward it, and Auth must publish it on
the bulletin board.
Given this, we first show that to achieve TimelyDR in any
topology, there must be a reliable path from H to Auth. That
is, both the channels from H to P as well as from P to Auth
must be reliable and the platform must be trusted to forward
messages correctly. This corresponds to the observation that,
in practice, when ballots can be dropped between H and Auth,
for example when they are cast by mail and not delivered by
the post office, then TimelyDR cannot hold even when both
the voter H and the authority Auth are honest.
Lemma 4. Let Pr be a protocol and T = (V,E, t, c) be a
topology in our voting protocol class such that G(T ) ⊆G GS ,
where GS is the topology graph in Figure 1.
TimelyDR(Pr, T ) =⇒
◦ r−→◦v c(H,P)∧ ◦ r−→◦v c(P,Auth) ∧ trustFwd v t(P).
Proof. We assume that there exists a protocol Pr that satisfies
TimelyDR(Pr, T ) for a topology T where (i) ◦ r−→◦ 6v c(H,P),
(ii)◦ r−→◦ 6v c(P,Auth), or (iii) trustFwd 6v t(P) and show that
such a protocol cannot exist by arriving at a contradiction. For
simplicity, we show the proof for Case (i), but it is analogous
for the Cases (ii) and (iii).
By the definition of a dispute resolution property (Def-
inition 5) and by the functional property Func (Defini-
tion 6), there exists a trace tr1 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth+H+) such
that ∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 ,H, b, [b]. tr1 = tr ′1· tr ′′1 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈
tr ′1 ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′1 ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr ′′1 ∧ tr1 ∈
honestNetw. Let tr1 be the smallest trace which satisfies this
property. As Auth is honest in this trace, it further holds that
hon(Auth) ∈ tr1 and since AuthP(Auth) holds, it follows that
∀b. tr1 /∈ Faulty(Auth, b).
Suppose that (i) holds. We show that there ex-
ists a trace tr2 in TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+), which contradicts
DR(Pr, T ,TimelyP(Auth), AuthP(Auth),Func). In tr2, the ad-
versary drops all ballots that are sent on the channel between
H and P but other than that behaves as in tr1. This is possible
because the channel (H,P) is not reliable in (i). Assume that in
tr2 all honest agents, including H and Auth, behave according
to the same role as in tr1 and as specified by Pr.
It holds that for some traces tr ′2 and tr
′′
2 and for some
list [b′], tr2 = tr ′2· tr ′′2 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′2 ∧ BBrec([b′]) ∈
tr ′2∧b /∈ [b′]∧End ∈ tr ′′2 . This trace exists since H casts b as
in tr1 and Auth publishes only received ballots which are by
construction the same as in tr1 except that Auth cannot have
received H’s ballot b. First, Auth cannot receive b from H, as
the adversary drops all ballots on the channel between H and
P. Moreover, as the adversary does not inject any messages
and all honest agents behave as in tr1, b can also not be
received by Auth through other channels. Nevertheless, Auth
follows the same role as in tr1 and, by the assumptions of our
protocol class, publishes the result even if it has not received
ballots from all voters. As b /∈ [b′], for tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth)
it must hold that tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b). However, for tr2 ∈
AuthP(Auth) it must hold that tr2 /∈ Faulty(Auth, b) as Auth
is honest. Thus we have a contradiction and such a protocol
Pr, where TimelyDR(Pr, T ) in Case (i), cannot exist.
The other cases can be shown analogously, as the adversary
can again drop the ballots that the voter H sends, either on
the channel from P to Auth (Case (ii)) or on P when it is
dishonest (Case (iii)). Note that we allow for protocols with
multiple instantiations of the roles. However, by the topology,
the channels from and to any instance of P have the same
channel type and any instance of P the same trust type.
Therefore, the adversary can drop the messages respectively on
all channels to and from any instance of P or on all instances
of P and the above contradiction can be derived independently
of the number of instances.
In addition to the above lemma, a second necessary con-
dition states that a topology must ensure the existence of
evidence, which is required in dispute resolution to unequiv-
ocally determine whether a ballot under dispute has been
received by the authority. This can be achieved under five
conditions (the five disjuncts in the next lemma). Evidence
can be ensured when one of the channels (H, P ) or (P,Auth)
is undeniable and generates public evidence that a ballot
must have been received by Auth. Alternatively, when P is
trusted, it can be used to keep a trustworthy record of the
cast ballots as evidence. Finally, evidence can be collected in
the form of some confirmation that is sent back from Auth.
This requires Auth to be trusted to provide a timely reply and
the confirmation must either be sent on an undeniable channel
(Auth,P) or it must be ensured that H receives the confirmation
by a reliable path from Auth to H.
Lemma 5. Let Pr be a protocol and T = (V,E, t, c) be a
topology in our voting protocol class such that G(T ) ⊆G GS ,
where GS is the topology graph in Figure 1.
TimelyDR(Pr, T ) =⇒
◦ u−→◦v c(H,P)∨ ◦ u−→◦v c(P,Auth) ∨ trusted v t(P)
∨(trustRpl v t(Auth)∧ ◦ u−→◦v c(Auth,P))
∨(trustRpl v t(Auth)∧ ◦ r−→◦v c(Auth,P)∧ ◦ r−→◦v c(P,H)).
Proof. We show the statement by proving its contrapositive,
i.e., we show that if all of the disjuncts are false, then so
is the property. We distinguish the three cases where all the
disjuncts are false. In all three cases, it holds that the first three
disjuncts are false, i.e., ◦ u−→◦ 6v c(H,P), ◦ u−→◦ 6v c(P,Auth),
and trusted 6v t(P). Additionally, it holds in Case (i) that
trustRpl 6v t(Auth), in Case (ii) that ◦ r−→◦ 6v c(Auth,P),
and in Case (iii) that ◦ u−→◦ 6v c(Auth,P)∧ ◦ r−→◦ 6v c(P,H).
For each case, we take the topology T with the strongest
assumptions and where all the conditions of this case hold, i.e.
T satisfies the conditions and ∀T ′. T ′satisfy conditions =⇒
T ′ v T , and show that there cannot exist any protocol
Pr such that TimelyDR(Pr, T ). It follows by Lemma 1 that
∀T ′. T ′ satisfies conditions =⇒ ¬∃Pr′. TimelyDR(Pr′, T ′)
(Lemma 1 implies that if there were a possibility result for
T ′, there would also be one for T , since T ′ v T ).
Case (i): Figure 5a depicts the maximal topology TI1 which
satisfies the conditions of this case. We assume that there exists
a protocol Pr such that TimelyDR(Pr, TI1) and show that this
leads to a contradiction. By the functional property and the
definition of Func:
∃tr ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth+H+I1 ), tr ′, tr ′′,H, b, [b]. tr = tr ′ · tr ′′
∧Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′ ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
∧tr ∈ honestNetw.
Let tr be the minimal trace satisfying this. We construct two
traces tr1 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I1 ) and tr2 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I1 ).
In tr1, all roles behave exactly as in tr , except for Auth
who ignores H’s ballot b when it is received. In particular,
Auth does not send any messages on (Auth,P) which depend
on the receipt of H’s ballot b and does not include b in the
published recorded ballots. This is possible as the adversary
has full control over Auth in this trace and can simulate all
send and receive events from tr but leave out selected ones. In
tr2, all roles behave as in tr , except that H, who is dishonest,
never casts the ballot b. This is possible as the adversary can
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(c) The maximal topology TI3 in Case (iii).
Fig. 5: Topologies for which it is impossible to achieve TimelyDR by Lemma 5.
simulate all behaviors of H in tr up to the point where H’s
ballot b is cast. Auth behaves in tr2 as in tr , however, as it
does not receive H’s ballot b, this is not included in the tallying
process. Recall that this complies with any role specification
of the authority as, by assumption of our protocol class, the
honest Auth does not wait for all voters’ ballots.
We next reason that the traces can be constructed such that
pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2), i.e., that all signals whose leading
function symbol is one of Ev, Pub, and BB are equal in both
traces. First, note that all signals Ev(b, ev) where ev only
consists of terms initially known by H, can be forged by the
adversary in tr2 as she compromises H and learns all his
secrets. Second, all signals Ev(b, ev) recorded in tr1 where
ev does not depend on terms that are only sent by Auth if it
has received b, are also recorded in tr2. Finally, messages that
are sent by Auth only when Auth has received the ballot b, are
never sent in tr1 by assumption and never sent in tr2 as Auth
does not receive b. Thus, if ev depends on such messages, it
can neither occur in a recorded signal in tr1 nor in tr2.
Similarly, any recorded signal whose leading function sym-
bol is one of BB or Pub in one trace can be simulated in the
other. In particular, all terms t appearing in signals BB(t) or
Pub(Auth,P, t) must have been sent by Auth. As the dishonest
Auth in tr1 has the same knowledge as the honest Auth in
tr2, the same terms can be sent to the bulletin board and over
the undeniable channel from Auth to P to generate the same
signals. Finally, all signals Pub(A,B, t), for A 6= Auth, are
equal: either sends on such channels do not depend on Auth
receiving H’s ballot and are done in both traces, or they do
depend on it and, in both traces, cannot possibly be done as
Auth ignores H’s ballot in tr1 and does not receive it in tr2.
We have shown that tr1 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I1 ) and tr2 ∈
TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I1 ) such that tr = pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2). By
TimelyP(Auth), it must hold that tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b), as the
honest voter’s ballot b is not recorded in tr1. However, by
AuthP(Auth), it must hold that tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b) as Auth
is honest in tr2, which yields a contradiction. Note that the
contradiction can be established independently of the number
of devices D and P that can communicate with a voter, as
each instantiation of D and P as well as all their incoming
and outgoing channels have the same trust and channel types,
respectively.
Case (ii): The maximal topology TI2 that satisfies these con-
ditions is depicted in Figure 5b. Similarly to Case (i), we as-
sume a protocol Pr for which TimelyDR(Pr, TI2) and construct
two traces tr3 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I2 ) and tr4 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I2 ) such
that tr = pubtr(tr3) = pubtr(tr4) and that yield a contradic-
tion as they respectively require that tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) and
tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b). In particular, this holds for tr4 = tr2,
where tr2 is from Case (i), and for tr3 which is as tr1 from
Case (i) except for the following differences. In tr3, instead
of ignoring H’s ballot b as in tr1, the partially trusted Auth
answers with any response required by the protocol but does
not further consider the ballot b, e.g., when writing all recorded
ballots on the bulletin board. The adversary then drops on the
channel (Auth,P) any such responses that are sent by Auth
only when the ballot b from H has been received. This results
in pubtr(tr3) = pubtr(tr1) and thus the conclusions from
Case (i) apply.
Case (iii): The maximal topology TI3 that satisfies these
conditions is depicted in Figure 5c. Again we assume a
protocol Pr for which TimelyDR(Pr, TI3) and construct two
traces tr5 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I3 ) and tr6 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I3 ) such that
tr = pubtr(tr5) = pubtr(tr6) and that yield a contradiction
as they respectively require that tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) and
tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b). This holds for tr6 = tr2, where tr2
is from Case (i), and for tr5 which is as tr3 from Case (ii),
except that the adversary drops all relevant messages sent by
Auth on the channel (P,H) instead of (Auth,P). The same
conclusions as in Cases (i) and (ii) follow.
b) Necessary conditions for T with G(T ) ⊆G GU : Next,
we consider the necessary conditions to satisfy TimelyDR
for topologies where the roles of the voter and platform are
unified. We will see that these conditions are closely related
to the ones established above. First, note that we require at
least the roles H and Auth and the channel (H,Auth) as H
must cast the ballot and Auth must publish it on the bulletin
board in order for the functional property to hold.
Next, similarly to Lemma 4, we establish that to achieve
TimelyDR in any topology, there must be a reliable channel
from H to Auth. This corresponds to the observation that, in
practice, in a remote e-voting setting when ballots are cast
over the insecure Internet where they can be dropped, then
TimelyDR cannot hold even when both the voter H and the
authority Auth are honest.
Lemma 6. Let Pr be a protocol and T = (V,E, t, c) be a
topology in our voting protocol class such that G(T ) ⊆G GU ,
where GU is the topology graph in Figure 1.
TimelyDR(Pr, T ) =⇒ ◦ r−→◦v c(H,Auth).
Proof. We assume that there exists a protocol Pr and a
topology T such that TimelyDR(Pr, T ) but where nevertheless
◦ r−→◦ 6v c(H,Auth) and show that such a protocol cannot exist
by arriving at a contradiction.
By the definition of a dispute resolution property (Defini-
tion 5) and by the functional property Func (Definition 6),
there exists a trace tr1 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth+H+) such that
∃tr ′1, tr ′′1 ,H, b, [b]. tr1 = tr ′1· tr ′′1 ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′1 ∧
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′1 ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ End ∈ tr ′′1 ∧ tr1 ∈ honestNetw.
Let tr1 be the smallest trace which satisfies this property.
As in the proof of Lemma 4, we show that there ex-
ists a trace tr2 in TR(Pr, T Auth
+H+), which contradicts
DR(Pr, T ,TimelyP(Auth), AuthP(Auth),Func). In particular,
this holds for a trace tr2 where all honest agents behave
according to the same role as in tr1 and where the adversary
drops all ballots that are sent on the channel between H and
Auth but other than that behaves as in tr1.
We can apply the reasoning from the proof of Lemma 4
and conclude that for tr2 ∈ TimelyP(Auth) it must hold that
tr2 ∈ Faulty(Auth, b), as the honest voter H’s ballot b is not
in the list of recorded ballots on the bulletin board in tr2.
However, at the same time, for tr2 ∈ AuthP(Auth) it must
hold that tr2 /∈ Faulty(Auth, b). Thus we have a contradiction
and such a protocol Pr, where TimelyDR(Pr, T ), cannot exist.
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 4, we can
also conclude that this holds independently of the number of
agents instantiating the roles.
As for the other setup, we show that a second necessary
condition is that a topology ensures the existence of evidence.
In particular, evidence can be established by an undeniable
channel from H to Auth. Alternatively it can be established
by a reliable channel (Auth, H) and a partially trusted Auth,
in which case a confirmation can be sent back from Auth to
H upon receiving the ballot, which can serve as evidence.
Lemma 7. Let Pr be a protocol and T = (V,E, t, c) be a
topology in our voting protocol class such that G(T ) ⊆G GU ,
where GU is the topology graph in Figure 1.
TimelyDR(Pr, T ) =⇒ ◦ u−→◦v c(H,Auth)
∨(trustRpl v t(Auth)∧ ◦ r−→◦v c(Auth,H)).
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 5, we show the statement by
proving its contrapositive, i.e., we show that if both disjuncts
are false, then so is the property. We distinguish the two cases
where the disjuncts are false. In Case (i), ◦ u−→◦ 6v c(H,Auth)
and trustRpl 6v t(Auth) and in Case (ii), ◦ u−→◦ 6v c(H,Auth)
and ◦ r−→◦ 6v c(Auth,H). Then, for both cases, we take the
topology T with the strongest assumptions and where all the
conditions of this case hold and show that there cannot exist
any protocol Pr such that TimelyDR(Pr, T ). As argued in
the proof of Lemma 5, this implies an impossibility for all
topologies satisfying the conditions (by Lemma 1).
Case (i): The maximal topology TI4 that satisfies these con-
ditions is depicted in Figure 6a. As in the proof of Lemma 5,
we assume a protocol Pr for which TimelyDR(Pr, TI4)
and construct two traces tr1 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I4 ) and tr2 ∈
TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I4 ) such that tr = pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2) and
that yield a contradiction as they respectively require that
tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) and tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b). In particular,
let tr1 be as tr1 in Lemma 5’s proof where Auth ignores H’s
ballot, except that here the fact that Auth ignores H’s ballot
b means that it never sends any message dependent on the
receipt of b on the channel (Auth, H) (rather than the channel
(Auth, P ) in Lemma 5’s proof). Also, let tr2 be as tr2 in
Lemma 5’s proof, where H never casts a ballot. As argued in
Lemma 5’s proof, this results in pubtr(tr1) = pubtr(tr2) and
yields a contradiction.
Case (ii): The maximal topology TI5 that satisfies these
conditions is depicted in Figure 6b. Again we assume a
protocol Pr for which TimelyDR(Pr, TI5) and construct two
traces tr3 ∈ TR(Pr, TH+I5 ) and tr4 ∈ TR(Pr, T Auth
+
I5 ) such that
tr = pubtr(tr3) = pubtr(tr4) and that yield a contradiction
as they respectively require that tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b) and
tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b). This holds for tr4 that is as tr2 from
Case (i), and for tr3 that is as tr1 from Case (i), except that in
tr3, instead of ignoring H’s ballot b, the partially trusted Auth
answers with any response required by the protocol but does
not further consider the ballot b, e.g., when writing all recorded
ballots on the bulletin board. The adversary then drops on the
channel (Auth,H) any such responses that are sent by Auth
only when the ballot b from H has been received. This results
in pubtr(tr3) = pubtr(tr1) and thus the same conclusions as
in Case (i) and in the proof of Lemma 5 apply.
c) Sufficient conditions: We next show that the above
conditions are also sufficient by showing that the seven
topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3 satisfy these conditions
and by establishing a possibility result for each of them. All
topologies have a reliable path from H to Auth, as this is
required by Lemmas 4 and 6, and additional trust assumptions,
required by Lemmas 5 and 7.
The next lemma states that for all these topologies, there ex-
ists a protocol that satisfies TimelyDR and that these topologies
are minimal. That is, there are no topologies that have weaker
assumptions than T1, . . . , T7 but where it is nevertheless
possible to achieve TimelyDR with some protocol. We establish
the lemma’s first part by presenting for each topology Ti,
i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} a protocol Pri and proving TimelyDR(Pri, Ti)
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(b) The maximal topology TI5 in Case (ii).
Fig. 6: Topologies for which it is impossible to achieve TimelyDR by Lemma 7.
H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB,P, v〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)knows(P, 〈Auth〉)
Vote(H, v)
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉 〈v, H〉
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃P, [b], H, v. Pub(P,Auth, b) ∈ tr
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b] ∧ b = 〈v,H〉}.
Fig. 7: The protocol Pr1.
with the Tamarin tool [32]. All relevant Tamarin files can be
found in [35].
Lemma 8. Let the Ti, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, be the topologies
depicted in Figure 3 and T be a topology in our voting protocol
class where T @ Ti for some i.
∃Pr. TimelyDR(Pr, Ti) ∧ ¬∃Pr′. TimelyDR(Pr′, T ).
Proof. Recall the topologies T1, . . . , T7 in Figure 3. We first
present for each topology Ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} a protocol Pri,
as depicted in Figures 7–13. We present the protocols using
message sequence charts, as explained in Section VI-D2. As
a simple protocol with one voter is sufficient to demonstrate
possibility, all protocols Pri specify that only one election is
run at a time with one voter H and one platform P . In all
protocols, the ballot is a pair consisting of the voter’s vote v
and his identity H. We extend the term algebra from Section II
by defining for the tally function the equation Tally(〈v,H〉) =
v. Moreover, for each protocol, the definition of Faulty is given
below the protocol’s message sequence chart.
For each topology Ti and protocol Pri, we
prove that TimelyDR(Pri, Ti) holds. To do this, we
model in three separate Tamarin theories the traces
H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB,P, v〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)knows(P, 〈Auth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBP (P )
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉 〈v, H〉
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃H,P, [b], v. Pub(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ BBP(P) ∈ tr
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b] ∧ b = 〈v,H〉}.
Fig. 8: The protocol Pr2.
TR(Pri, T Auth
+H+
i ), TR(Pri, T
H+
i ), and TR(Pri, T
Auth+
i ). We
then automatically prove that TR(Pri, TH
+
i ) ⊆ TimelyP(Auth),
TR(Pri, T Auth
+
i ) ⊆ AuthP(Auth), and TR(Pri, T Auth
+H+
i ) ⊆
TimelyP(Auth) ∩ AuthP(Auth). All relevant Tamarin files are
in [35]. Furthermore, it is obvious that all protocols satisfy
TR(Pri, T Auth
+H+
i )∩Func 6= ∅.
Next, we examine for each topology Ti in Figure 3 all
minimal possibilities of making the topology weaker,
i.e., to generate a topology T ′ such that T ′ @ Ti and
¬∃TM . T ′ @ TM @ Ti. We then argue that any such
topology T ′ cannot satisfy TimelyDR for any protocol,
by Lemmas 4–7. It follows by Lemma 1 that all weaker
topologies T ′′ v T ′ also cannot satisfy the property (as this
would imply that T ′ satisfies the property, too). Note that
we can weaken a topology in three ways: by weakening the
channel assumptions, by weakening the trust assumptions, or
by removing a channel or a role.
First, recall that by assumption of our protocol class, the
roles BB and A and their incoming and outgoing channels are
fixed. Furthermore, for in the topologies T1, . . . , T5, we cannot
remove the channels (H,P) or (P,Auth) or the roles H, P, or
H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB,P, v〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)knows(P, 〈Auth, skP〉)
BBpkP (pk(skP))Vote(H, v)
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉
Ev(〈v, H〉, {〈v, H〉}skP)
〈v, H〉
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃c, [b], pkP . BBpkP (pkP ) ∈ tr
∧Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkP ) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]}.
Fig. 9: The protocol Pr3.
H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB,P, v〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth〉)
knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)knows(P, 〈Auth,H〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpk(pk(skAuth))
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉 〈v, H〉
{〈v, H〉}skAuth{〈v, H〉}skAuth
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)Ev(〈v, H〉, {〈v, H〉}skAuth)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃c, pkAuth, [b]. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr
∧Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]}.
Fig. 10: The protocol Pr4.
H P Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB,P, v〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth〉)
knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)knows(P, 〈Auth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpk(pk(skAuth))
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉 〈v, H〉
{〈v, H〉}skAuth
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃c,P, pkAuth, [b]. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr
∧Pub(Auth,P, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]}.
Fig. 11: The protocol Pr5.
H Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB, v,Auth〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)
Vote(H, v)
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃H, [b], v. Pub(H,Auth, b) ∈ tr
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b] ∧ b = 〈v,H〉}.
Fig. 12: The protocol Pr6.
H Auth BB
knows(H, 〈BB, v,Auth〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpk(pk(skAuth))
Ballot(H, 〈v, H〉)
〈v, H〉
{〈v, H〉}skAuth
v := Tally(〈v, H〉)Ev(〈v, H〉, {〈v, H〉}skAuth)
〈v, H〉, v
BBrec(〈v, H〉),
BBtal(v)
End〈v, H〉
verifyC(H, 〈v, H〉)
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |∃c, pkAuth, [b]. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr
∧Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b]}
Fig. 13: The protocol Pr7.
Auth, as otherwise the functional property cannot hold. For
the same reason, we cannot remove the channel (H,Auth) or
the roles H or Auth in the topologies T6 and T7. We further
argue that we cannot weaken any other assumptions either.
Topology T1: When generating T ′ by making the channel
(H,P) default or by making P untrusted, T ′ cannot satisfy
TimelyDR by Lemma 4. Also, by Lemma 5, the same is true
when we make the channel (P,Auth) reliable only.
Topology T2: When generating T ′ by making the channel
(P,Auth) default or by making P untrusted, T ′ cannot satisfy
TimelyDR by Lemma 4. Also, by Lemma 5, the same is true
when we make the channel (H,P) reliable only.
Topology T3: When generating T ′ by making any of
the channels (H,P) or (P,Auth) default, T ′ cannot satisfy
TimelyDR by Lemma 4. Also, by Lemma 5, the same is true
when we make P of type trustFwd only.
Topology T4: When generating T ′ by making the channels
(H,P) or (P,Auth) default or by making P untrusted, T ′
cannot satisfy TimelyDR by Lemma 4. Also, by Lemma 5,
the same is true when we make Auth untrusted, or when we
make either of the channels (Auth,P) or (P,H) default.
Topology T5: When generating T ′ by making the channels
(H,P) or (P,Auth) default or by making P untrusted, T ′
cannot satisfy TimelyDR by Lemma 4. Also, by Lemma 5,
the same is true when we make Auth untrusted, or when we
make the channel (Auth,P) reliable only.
Topology T6: When generating T ′ by making the channel
(H,Auth) reliable, T ′ cannot satisfy TimelyDR by Lemma 7.
Topology T7: When generating T ′ by making the channel
(H,Auth) default, T ′ cannot satisfy TimelyDR by Lemma 6.
Also, by Lemma 7, the same is true when we make Auth
untrusted, or when we make the channel (Auth,H) default.
In all cases, there are no further options to weaken the given
topology in a minimal way.
Finally, we use the above results to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The theorem’s statement is a direct con-
sequence of Lemmas 1 and 8 and because T1, . . . , T7 are the
only minimal topologies that satisfy all requirements necessary
by Lemmas 4–7. The latter is established by an exhaustive
case distinction on the finitely many possible topologies: each
possible way of exchanging one assumption in a topology
T1, . . . , T7 by another one, results either in a topology T ′
that does not satisfy the conditions required by Lemmas 4–
7 or in a topology T ′ that makes stronger assumptions than
one of the seven topologies and is thus not minimal, i.e.,
∃Tj ∈ {T1, . . . , T7}. Tj @ T ′.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We next prove Theorem 2 from Section VI, which states
that Uniqueness(Auth) can be used to infer VoterA(Auth) in
disputes D2 in protocols that satisfy certain conditions.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Pr be a protocol as assumed by the
theorem. Let tr be a trace in TR(Pr, T ) such that tr ∈
Uniqueness(Auth) and such that there is a voter H for which
verifyA(H, ∅) ∈ tr . All traces where no such signal verifyA is
recorded trivially satisfy VoterA(Auth) and as Pr is a protocol
without re-voting, verifyA is only recorded for honest voters
who abstain (that is, there are no signals verifyA(H,x) for
x 6= ∅).
We make a case distinction. First, assume
¬(∃[b], b. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ castBy(b) = H).
Then, VoterA(Auth) holds by Definition 3.
Second, assume ∃[b], b. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧
castBy(b) = H . Thus, we consider a trace where
tr ∈ Uniqueness(Auth) ∧ verifyA(H, ∅) ∈ tr
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b] ∧ castBy(b) = H
(1)
=⇒tr ∈ Uniqueness(Auth) ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr
∧b ∈ [b] ∧ castBy(b) = H ∧ ¬∃m,A. send(H,A,m) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒¬∃b′.b′ 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′)
(3)
=⇒∃b′.tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b′).
In (1), we use that verifyA is only recorded for an honest voter
who abstains and thus, by assumption, does not send any mes-
sage. In (2) we use that Uniqueness(Auth) holds and therefore
there cannot be any b′ 6=⊥ such that tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′)
as this would require that send(H,A′,m′) is in the trace for
some A′ and m′ such that m′ ` b, which is false. Thus, for
all ballots b′ 6=⊥ the trace tr must be in Faulty(Auth, b′) and
Step (3) follows (for an arbitrary choice of a ballot b′ 6=⊥).
Thus, tr satisfies VoterA(Auth) by Definition 3.
C. Analyzing a mixnet-based voting protocol with dispute
resolution
We present the details of the protocol MixVote and show
that it satisfies dispute resolution as well as other standard
voting properties. To formalize the protocol, we first extend
the protocol model from Section II with new functions and
equations. Then, we present the communication topology
and the detailed protocol specification. Finally, we present
the (instantiated) dispute resolution properties, introduce new
properties, and analyze the protocol. Our model and the defini-
tions of the properties other than dispute resolution are closely
related to [5], where a voting protocol has been analyzed in a
formalism supported by the Tamarin tool.
1) New functions and equations: Let [l1] and [l2] be two
lists. We denote by [l1] ⊆l [l2] that the elements of [l1] are a
sub-multiset of the elements of [l2]. Next, we introduce a gen-
eralization of the signature verification function ver that is ap-
plied to a list of signed messages and a list of verification keys,
where the lists are of the same length. The function is denoted
by verL([s], [k]) and if each signed message [s]i is verified
with the verification key [k]i, then the function returns the list
of messages that were included in [s] but with the signatures
removed. Otherwise, the function returns the default value ⊥.
verL([s], [k]) :=
{
[m], ∀i. ver([s]i, [k]i) = [m]i ∧ [m]i 6=⊥
⊥, otherwise.
MixVote uses non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to
shuffle, i.e., randomly permute and re-encrypt, and decrypt
ballots in a publicly verifiable manner. First, we introduce a
probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme. The encryption
of the message m under the public key pk and using the
randomness r is denoted by {m}rpk and the decryption of
the ciphertext c with the private key k by decp(c, k). The
functions obey the equation decp({m}rpk(k), k) = m. Then,
we introduce zkp([i], [o], k) to denote the non-interactive zero
knowledge proof that the list [i] was correctly shuffled and its
elements correctly decrypted to the elements in [o]. Thereby,
k denotes the private key needed to decrypt the messages in
[i] and to generate a correct proof. A zero knowledge proof
can be verified using the function verzk(p, [i’], [o’], pk′), which
takes as input a proof p, two lists [i’] and [o’], where the
latter presumably contains the decryptions of the former up
to permutation, and a public key pk′. Such a verification is
successful if the following three conditions hold.
1) p is a non-interactive zero knowledge proof that was
constructed with respect to permutations of the two lists
that were input to the verification function ([i’] and [o’]
above).
2) The elements of the first list [i’] correspond to encryp-
tions of the elements of the second list [o’], but can be
permuted.
3) The proof p was constructed with the private key k
corresponding to the public key pk′ = pk(k) used in the
verification and the elements in the list [i’] are encrypted
with the same key pk′.
HD P Auth
BBA
r
d
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Fig. 14: The topology TMV for the protocol MixVote.
The last condition means that only an agent who possesses
the private key to decrypt the messages in [i’] can construct a
valid proof. The following equation models these conditions,
where pi1, pi2, and pi3 denote arbitrary permutations and pi[x]
denotes that permutation pi is a applied to the list [x].
verzk(zkp(pi1[{m}rpk(k)], pi2[m], k), pi3[{m}rpk(k)], [m],
pk(k)) = true.
These functions could, for example, be realized by the scheme
of Groth [22], who proposes a zero knowledge proof for
the combined shuffle-and-decrypt operation. In [22], several
decryption servers each possess a share of the private key
corresponding to the public key used for the encryptions. Each
server, in turn, shuffles the ballots and decrypts them with
respect to its key share. As we only consider one agent Auth,
we can use Groth’s scheme where Auth performs all servers’
computations.
In addition to the new functions, we extend our protocol
model with new signals, which we explain next while pre-
senting the protocol.
2) Protocol and communication topology: MixVote’s com-
munication topology TMV and detailed protocol steps are
respectively depicted in Figures 14 and 15. As explained in
Section VI-D2, we present the protocol as a message sequence
chart.
The topology specifies roles for the trusted off-line device
D, only connected to the voter H , and the platform P , through
which H can access Auth. Apart from the fixed assumptions
about the roles BB, A and their incoming and outgoing
channels, the topology specifies the following assumptions.
We assume that the channels (H,D) and (D,H) are secure
and default. Moreover, the network between H and Auth is
insecure but the channels (H,P ), (P,Auth), (Auth, P ), and
(P,H) reliably deliver messages. P is partially trusted to
forward messages and Auth is partially trusted to reply with
a confirmation when it receives a valid ballot. Except for the
device D, the topology is as the topology T4 (Figure 3d) and
can be interpreted as explained in Section VI-A.
As Auth naturally learns how each voter voted when collect-
ing and tallying the ballots, there are no privacy guarantees if
Auth is not trusted. For simplicity, and as other authors [1], [5],
[14], we thus model a trusted Auth when examining privacy
properties. In reality, this trust could be distributed as is done
in other work, e.g., [15], [20].
We assume that, at each point in time, only one election
takes place, i.e., there are no parallel sessions. Moreover, the
protocol’s setup specifies that there is a single agent Auth and
D H P Auth A BB
knows(H, 〈D,P,BB, v〉) knows(Auth, 〈skAuth, [pkD]〉) knows(BB, 〈Auth, [pkD], pkAuth, [H]〉)
knows(D, 〈H,Auth, pkAuth, skD〉) knows(P, 〈H,Auth〉) knows(A, 〈Auth,BB, pkAuth〉)
Vote(H, v) BBpkD([pkD]),BBpk(pkAuth)
BBH([H]),Corr([H, pkD])
v
fresh r
b := {{v}rpkAuth}skD
b
Ballot(H, b)
b b
If valid, add b to [b]
and respective key to [pkuD]
{b}skAuth{b}skAuth
Ev(b, {b}skAuth) [b˜] := verL([b], [pkuD])
[v] := pi[decp(b˜, skAuth)]
p := zkp([b˜], [v], skAuth)
[b], [b˜], [v], p
BBrec([b]),BBwoS([b˜]),
BBtal([v]),BBzk(p)
End
[b], [b˜], [v], p, [pkD][b]
verifyC(H, b), verifyH(H, b ∈ [b]) verifyA1(A,∃[pkuD].[pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]∧
[b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]))
verifyA2(A, verzk(p, [b˜], [v], pkAuth))
For b =⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {}.
For b 6=⊥: Faulty(Auth, b) := {tr |(∃[b], pkAuth, c. BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr ∧ Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧ ver(c, pkAuth) = b ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b])
∨(∃[b], [pkD], [b˜]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr ∧ (¬∃[pkuD]. [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD] ∧ [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD])))}.
Fig. 15: The protocol MixVote, or PrMV, where pkD = pk(skD), pkAuth = pk(skAuth), and castBy(b) = H holds iff
∃pk. ver(b, pk) 6=⊥ ∧〈H, pk〉 ∈ [H, pk]∧Corr([H, pk]) ∈ tr . The protocol’s setup specifies a single agent Auth, that each voter
H is associated with a unique trusted off-line device D, and that there is no restriction on the relation between voters H and
platforms P , i.e., several voters can be connected with the same P . The role for a voter H who abstains consists of receiving
the list of recorded ballots from the bulletin board followed by the signal verifyA(H, ∅).
that each voter H has a unique trusted device D to which he
has exclusive access. In contrast, there is no fixed relation
between platforms and voters, i.e., several voters may use
the same platform P to cast their ballot. For readability, we
explain the protocol for one voter, device, and platform in
Figure 15. At the protocol’s start, the device and authority
each know a unique private key (skD and skAuth, respectively)
and know each others corresponding public key, which is also
published on the bulletin board BB. Moreover, BB contains
the list of all eligible voters [H] and information on which
signing key corresponds to which eligible voter, i.e., which
signing key is installed on that voter’s device. We denote the
later by the signal Corr([H, pkD]), where each pair 〈H, pkD〉
in the list denotes that the signing key corresponding to pkD
is installed on H’s device.
To compute a ballot, a voter enters his vote on his device
D. D generates a fresh random number r (denoted by fresh),
uses r to probabilistically encrypt the vote under Auth’s public
key, and signs the resulting encryption with its signing key.
D displays the computed ballot to H and H casts the ballot
(denoted by the signal Ballot) by entering it on his platform
P from where it is forwarded to Auth. This communication
could, for example, be realized by D displaying the ballot as a
QR code and H scanning this code with P . Upon receiving a
ballot, Auth checks whether it is well-formed and signed with
an eligible voter’s key. If this is the case, Auth adds the ballot
to the list of recorded ballots [b] and the respective verification
key to [pkuD] to keep track of the used public keys, as each
voter can only vote once. Also, Auth sends as confirmation
the signed ballot back to H via P , where the voter keeps it
as evidence in case of subsequent disputes.
After the voting phase ends, Auth computes the tally. Instead
of the function Tally, we describe this procedure in terms of
several, more detailed steps: Auth removes the signatures from
the recorded ballots, shuffles and decrypts the resulting encryp-
tions with its private key, and produces a zero knowledge proof
that these operations were done correctly. Auth then publishes
all the lists and the proof on the bulletin board, where an
auditor can read them.
The auditor first checks that all recorded ballots contain
a signature corresponding to a unique public key in [pkD].
Then, the auditor verifies the zero knowledge proof. We
denote this respectively by the explicit signals verifyA1(A, p1)
and verifyA2(A, p2), which record that the agent A checks
whether the predicates p1 and p2 hold. In the protocol’s
traces, these signals are recorded as verifyA1(A, p1, t1) and
verifyA2(A, p2, t2), with t1, t2 ∈ {true, false} respectively
indicating whether the predicate p1 and p2 is satisfied in this
particular trace. This allows us to refer both to the terms that
are evaluated in the predicate and the predicate’s truth value
during execution.
Moreover, the voter reads the list of recorded ballots from
BB and checks whether his ballot is contained in this list.
In addition to verifyC(H, b), this is recorded by the signal
verifyH(H, b ∈ [b]), which we will need to express individual
verifiability. As with verifyA1 and verifyA2, verifyH denotes the
agent and the checked predicate and contains in the protocol’s
trace a third argument stating whether the predicate is satisfied.
Finally, a voter who abstains does not send any messages.
After the results are published, he reads from the bulletin board
the list of recorded ballots and believes at that step that no
ballot is recorded for him, which is recorded by the signal
verifyA(H, ∅).
We complete the protocol specification as follows. A ballot
is considered to be cast by a voter when the ballot’s signature
can be verified with the public key associated with this voter.
That is castBy(b) = H iff there exists a verification key pk
such that ver(b, pk) 6=⊥ ∧〈H, pk〉 ∈ [H, pk]∧Corr([H, pk]) ∈
tr . Moreover, we define the verdict that Auth behaved dis-
honestly as the set of traces where a) there exists evidence
consisting of a ballot signed by Auth but this ballot is not
included in the recorded ballots on the bulletin board or b)
there are recorded ballots that are not signed by a unique
eligible voter. The corresponding set Faulty is defined in
Figure 15.
3) Security properties: With the above instantiation of the
function Faulty, all introduced dispute resolution properties
are now defined and can be analyzed. As the definition of
Uniqueness(Auth) additionally contains castBy, we explicitly
instantiate this part for simplicity.
Definition 9. Let the length of the list [b] be n.
Uniqueness(Auth) := {tr | b 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b)
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ j ∈ {1, . . . , n} =⇒
∃[H], i′, j′, [pk], pk1, pk2, A1, A2,m1,m2. BBH([H]) ∈ tr
∧Corr([H, pk]) ∈ tr ∧ ver([b]i, pk1) 6=⊥ ∧ ver([b]j , pk2) 6=⊥
∧〈[H]i′ , pk1〉 ∈ [H, pk] ∧ 〈[H]j′ , pk2〉 ∈ [H, pk]
∧send([H]i′ , A1,m1) ∈ tr ∧ send([H]j′ , A2,m2) ∈ tr
∧m1 ` [b]i ∧m2 ` [b]j ∧ (i 6= j =⇒ [H]i′ 6= [H]j′)}.
Compared to the more general definition of
Uniqueness(Auth) from Definition 7, the function castBy is
instantiated in the fourth and fifth line.
In addition to the dispute resolution properties, we analyze
standard verifiability and privacy properties that we introduce
next. We start with individual verifiability, or IndivVerif for
short, that states that whenever a voter verifies that his ballot is
in the list of recorded ballots, then indeed one of the recorded
ballots corresponds to his vote. The property’s definition is
based on individual verifiability due to [5] and [26].
Definition 10.
IndivVerif := {tr | verifyH(H, b ∈ [b], true) ∈ tr∧
Vote(H, v) ∈ tr =⇒ ∃[b′], pkAuth, r, skD.
BBrec([b′]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b′] ∧ b = {{v}rpkAuth}skD}.
Next, we introduce the universal verifiability property
Tallied-as-recorded that states that any auditor can verify that
all recorded ballots are counted correctly in the final tally.
In particular, if an auditor performs its specified checks on
some lists, then the bulletin board contains the same lists of
ballots, votes, and verification keys, the votes in the final tally
correspond to the votes encrypted in the recorded ballots, and
each ballot contains a signature associated with a different
verification key in [pkD]. The order of the votes and ballots
can be permuted, as indicated by the permutation pi.
Definition 11.
Tallied-as-Recorded := {tr | verifyA1(A,∃[pkuD].
[pkuD] ⊆l [pkD] ∧ [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]), true) ∈ tr
∧verifyA2(A, verzk(p, [b˜], [v], pkAuth), true) ∈ tr =⇒
∃[r], [skD], pi. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBtal([v]) ∈ tr∧
BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ [b] = pi[{{v}rpkAuth}skD ]
∧[pk(skD)] = [pkuD] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]}.
We then define end-to-end verifiability, or End2EndVerif for
short, as the conjunction of individual verifiability and tallied-
as-recorded.
Definition 12.
End2EndVerif := IndivVerif ∩ Tallied-as-Recorded.
Eligibility verifiability is another universal verifiability prop-
erty that is defined by Kremer et al. [26] as the property that
“anyone can check that each vote in the election outcome
was cast by a registered voter and there is at most one vote
per voter.” We denote the property by EligVerif and define it
conditional on an auditor A performing all of its specified
verifiability checks. If these checks are verified, then each
vote in the published final tally must have been sent by an
eligible voter H . Furthermore, no two votes in the final tally
correspond to the same voter.
Definition 13. Let n be the length of the list [v].
EligVerif := {tr | verifyA1(A,∃[pkuD].[pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
∧[b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]), true) ∈ tr
∧verifyA2(A, verzk(p, [b˜], [v], pkAuth), true) ∈ tr
∧i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
=⇒ ∃[H], i′, j′, A,A′. BBH([H]) ∈ tr ∧ BBtal([v]) ∈ tr
∧send([H]i′ , A, [v]i) ∈ tr ∧ send([H]j′ , A′, [v]j) ∈ tr
∧(i 6= j =⇒ [H]i′ 6= [H]j′)}.
Note that Uniqueness and EligVerif make similar guarantees
in that both state that each element of a list is associated with
a unique eligible voter. EligVerif states this guarantee with
respect to all votes in the final tally. In contrast, Uniqueness
states the guarantee for the recorded ballots as these are the
relevant terms for the disputes.
Next, we introduce the privacy property receipt-freeness.
Whereas vote privacy denotes that an adversary cannot link
voters to their votes, receipt-freeness is strictly stronger and
additionally requires that this holds even when a voter reveals
his secrets to the adversary, i.e., when he tries to provide a
receipt of his vote. This property is important, as a protocol
should ensure privacy even when honest voters are forced by
an adversary to reveal private information.
As [5] and similarly to [18], we define receipt-freeness as
an observational equivalence property, which states that an
adversary cannot distinguish between two systems. Concretely,
we define a left system where the voter A votes v1 and the
voter B votes v2 and a right system where A votes v2 and B
votes v1. Moreover, we change the original protocol Pr to Pr′
where A sends all his secrets to the adversary except that A
always claims that his vote is v1 (which is only true in the left
system). We then define a set S of trace pairs (trL, trR) where
trL is from the left system and trR from the right system. A
protocol Pr satisfies receipt-freeness if for all traces of Pr′ in
one system, there exists a trace in the other system such that
the pair of traces is contained in S.
We use the notation Prm1←m′1,m2←m′2 to denote the spec-
ification of the protocol Pr where each occurrence of the
terms m1 and m2 is replaced by m′1 and m
′
2, respectively.
Furthermore, we write t1 ≈ t2 to denote that two traces
are indistinguishable for an adversary. We use this definition
informally here and refer to [3] for a formal definition of ≈.
Definition 14. Let Pr′ be the protocol obtained from Pr as
described above, let vA and vB be the term that denotes A’s
and B’s vote, respectively, and let v1 and v2 be message terms.
Receipt-freeness of the protocol Pr run in the topology T is
defined as follows.
Receipt-freeness :={(trL, trR) ∈
TR(Pr′vA←v1,vB←v2 , T )× TR(Pr′vA←v2,vB←v1 , T )
| trL ≈ trR}.
This set defines all indistinguishable trace pairs such that the
traces are from two systems where A and B vote the opposite
way. A reveals all secrets, except he claims in both systems
that he votes v1, which is only true in the left system.
4) Analysis: As mentioned in Section VI-D, by Theorem 1
it is possible to achieve TimelyDR in the topology TMV as
T4 v TMV. We next analyze whether MixVote in Figure 15,
PrMV for short, indeed satisfies all above properties when run
in the topology TMV. Recall that VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth),
and VoterA(Auth) are guarantees for the voter and should hold
for a distinguished voter H , even when the authority Auth and
all other voters are dishonest. Similarly, Uniqueness(Auth) and
the verifiability properties must hold even when the authority
is dishonest. In contrast, AuthP(Auth) is a guarantee for Auth
and should hold even when all voters are dishonest. Finally,
recall that we assume for receipt-freeness that Auth is honest.
Theorem 3. MixVote satisfies VoterC(Auth), TimelyP(Auth),
VoterA(Auth), AuthP(Auth), Uniqueness(Auth), IndivVerif,
Tallied-as-Recorded, End2EndVerif , EligVerif , and Receipt-
freeness when run in the topology T Auth
+H+
MV . When run in
the topology TH
+
MV , the protocol satisfies the same properties,
except for AuthP(Auth) and Receipt-freeness. When run in the
topology T Auth
+
MV the protocol satisfies AuthP(Auth).
Proof. To prove the theorem, we combine proofs by Tamarin
with pen-and-paper proofs. We establish all properties except
for VoterA(Auth), End2EndVerif , and Receipt-freeness for one
voter who casts a vote in Tamarin and model each of the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV , T
H+
MV , and T
Auth+
MV in a separate Tamarin
theory. Moreover, to prove Receipt-freeness we model two
voters as explained above and automatically prove the property
in the topology T Auth
+H+
MV using Tamarin’s built in support for
observational equivalence [3]. All Tamarin files can be found
in [35].
As Tamarin requires specifying a fixed number of voters,
we prove by hand in the Lemmas 9–15 below that the prop-
erties TimelyP(Auth), VoterC(Auth), AuthP(Auth), IndivVerif,
Tallied-as-Recorded, Uniqueness(Auth), and EligVerif also
hold for an arbitrary number of voters in the topologies
claimed by the theorem. We then show in Lemma 16 that
VoterA(Auth) is implied by Uniqueness(Auth) in the re-
quired topologies, as Theorem 2 can be applied. Finally, as
End2EndVerif is the intersection of IndivVerif and Tallied-as-
Recorded, it directly follows that End2EndVerif also holds in
the required adversary models.
Lemma 9. MixVote satisfies TimelyP(Auth) when run in the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let H be the distinguished voter for which the prop-
erty should hold, independently of whether or not there are
other (dishonest) voters in the system. Let tr be a trace in
TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV )∪ TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that tr = tr
′ · tr ′′
and Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ and End ∈ tr ′′.
tr = tr ′ · tr ′′ ∧ Ballot(H, b) ∈ tr ′ ∧ End ∈ tr ′′
(1)
=⇒∃P, [b]. send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ′
(2)
=⇒send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ rec(H,P, b) ∈ tr
∧send(P,Auth, b) ∈ tr
(3)
=⇒send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ rec(P,Auth, b) ∈ tr
(4)
=⇒∃skAuth. send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ send(Auth, P, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr
∧BBpk(pk(skAuth)) ∈ tr
(5)
=⇒send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ rec(Auth, P, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr
∧send(P,H, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr ∧ rec(P,H, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr
(6)
=⇒Ev(b, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr
The first conjunct of Step (1) holds as Ballot(H, b) is recorded
when H sends the ballot. Note that the honest voter H only
sends this message on the channel (H,P ). The second part of
Step (1) holds as End is be definition recorded after the last
message is published on the bulletin board. Thus, for some
list [b], BBrec([b]) is recorded in the trace before End. Step (2)
follows by the fact that in both topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV ,
it holds that c(H,P ) = ◦ r−→◦, t(H) = trusted, and t(P ) =
trustFwd. Thus, by the restrictions from Section II-E2, each
message that is sent from H to P will be received by P .
Moreover, by the fact that t(P ) = trustFwd P always
forwards messages correctly, i.e., P forwards the ballot to the
(unique) authority Auth. Similarly to Step (2), Steps (3) and
(4) follow by the assumption that the channel from P to Auth
is reliable and that t(Auth) = trustRpl. In particular, as Auth is
partially trusted to answer with the (correct) confirmation for
a valid ballot, it sends back the ballot signed with its (correct)
signing key (as H and his device D are honest, the ballot b is
valid). By the shared initial knowledge, the setup assumptions,
and since the bulletin board is honest by the topology TMV, the
public key corresponding to Auth’s signing key is published
on the bulletin board (second part in Step (4)). In Step (5),
we use the same reasoning as in Steps (2) and (3) for the
channels (Auth, P ) and (P,H) which are also reliably by TMV.
By the protocol specification, when the honest H receives
the confirmation, the signal Ev is recorded, where the first
argument is the ballot that H sent and the second the received
confirmation. Thus (6) holds.
Finally, we make a case distinction. First, let b ∈ [b].
Then, it immediately follows that TimelyP(Auth) holds. Sec-
ond, let b /∈ [b]. Then, it holds that BBpk(pk(skAuth)) ∈
tr ∧ Ev(b, {b}skAuth) ∈ tr ∧ ver({b}skAuth , pk(skAuth)) = b ∧
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ b /∈ [b] and thus, by the definition of Faulty
it holds that tr ∈ Faulty(Auth, b). Therefore, TimelyP(Auth)
also holds in this case.
Lemma 10. MixVote satisfies VoterC(Auth) when run in the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let H be the distinguished voter for which the
property should hold, independently of whether there are
other (dishonest) voters in the system. Let tr be a
trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪ TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that
verifyC(H, b) ∈ tr .
verifyC(H, b) ∈ tr
(1)
=⇒∃P, [b],BB. send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ rec(BB, H, [b]) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ send(BB, H, [b]) ∈ tr
(3)
=⇒send(H,P, b) ∈ tr ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr
As H is honest in T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV , he follows his role
specification. Thus, when verifyC(H, b) is in the trace, so are
the signals send(H,P, b) for some P and rec(BB, H, [b]) for
some BB and [b] as these signals are preceding the verifiability
check in H’s role (Step (1)). By the topology TMV, the
channel (BB, H) is authentic. Therefore, BB must have sent
the message [b] for H to receive it on this channel (Step
(2)). Moreover, BB is honest by the topology TMV. Thus,
BB only sends one message containing a single list, which
was previously recorded in the signal BBrec. In particular, as
there are no parallel sessions, this list cannot be confused
with another list sent by BB and it follows in Step (3) that
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr .
We now have a trace with the same signals as in the proof
of Lemma 9 after Step (1). We can thus apply the same steps
as in the Proof of Lemma 9 to conclude that VoterC(Auth)
holds in all the required topologies. (Note that in the proof of
Lemma 9, BBrec is in the subtrace tr ′ rather than in tr , which
is however not needed in the further proof steps.)
Lemma 11. MixVote satisfies AuthP(Auth) when run in the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
Auth+
MV .
Proof. Let tr be a trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, T Auth
+
MV ), such that hon(Auth) ∈ tr . We show
that, for all ballots b, this trace is not in Faulty(Auth, b).
First, consider b =⊥. As Faulty(Auth,⊥) = {} and
as we just defined that hon(Auth) ∈ tr , it holds that
tr /∈ Faulty(Auth,⊥).
We thus consider only ballots b different from ⊥ in the
following and show that tr is not in Faulty(Auth, b) by
separately showing that tr satisfies neither of the two disjuncts
of the definition of Faulty(Auth, b) for ballots b 6=⊥. We start
with the second disjunct and assume that the corresponding
lists are published on the bulletin board. If this is not given,
the second disjunct is false and we are done.
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr
(1)
=⇒∃skAuthBB, [v], p. knows(Auth, 〈skAuth, [pkD]〉) ∈ tr
∧send(Auth,BB, 〈[b], [b˜], [v], p〉) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒∃[pkuD]. [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]) ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
The first part of Step (1) holds by the shared initial knowledge
specified in the protocol and as BB is honest by the topology
TMV. Thus, BB and Auth share the same list [pkD] in their
initial knowledge that BB has published in the signal BBpkD.
Also, there are no parallel sessions so no message confusion
is possible. The second part of Step (1) holds as the honest
BB only records the lists [b] and [b˜] after it has received them
from Auth as the first two of four messages. As the channel
(Auth,BB) is authentic by topology TMV, Auth must thus have
sent these messages for BB to receive them.
Next, as Auth only sends one message to BB and as there
are no parallel sessions, the lists sent by Auth respectively
correspond to the correctly computed ballots, ballots without
signatures, tallied votes, and the zero knowledge proof. Thus,
in particular, each recorded ballot is signed by a unique eligible
voter’s signing key, hence Step (2) holds. (Note that the honest
Auth uses the list [pkD] from its initial knowledge for its check
whether a ballot is valid.) This is a contradiction to the second
disjunct in Faulty’s definition, which thus cannot be satisfied
by the trace tr .
Next, we show that the first disjunct in the definition of
Faulty(Auth, b) for ballots b 6=⊥ is also not satisfied by tr .
Let S be an explicit signal, i.e., a top-level function in our
protocol model, and let x and y be arbitrary terms. Assume
that there is a signal in the trace tr , which contains a subterm
signed by Auth’s signing key. Recall that m2 ` m1 denotes
that m1 is a subterm of the composed message m2.
hon(Auth) ∈ tr ∧ S(x) ∈ tr ∧ x ` {y}skAuth
∧BBpk(pk(skAuth)) ∈ tr
=⇒∃A, x′. send(Auth, A, x′) ∈ tr ∧ x′ ` {y}skAuth
The implication holds since, by the initial knowledge specified
in the protocol, only Auth knows the signing key skAuth
corresponding to the public key published in BBpk by BB
(which is honest by topology TMV). Furthermore, no one can
learn skAuth during the protocol execution and no explicit signal
is recorded in Auth’s role. In particular, the former holds as
Auth only sends out messages containing skAuth where skAuth
is used as a signing key, which cannot be extracted by our
equational theory. It follows that Auth must have sent a term
containing {y}skAuth for it to be recorded in an explicit signal
in the trace and thus the implication holds.
Next, we make a case distinction. First, suppose that
there are no recorded ballots on the bulletin board, that is
¬∃[b]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr . Then it follows that ∀b. tr /∈
Faulty(Auth, b).
Second, suppose that there are some recorded ballots on the
bulletin board.
∃[b]. send(Auth, A, x′) ∈ tr ∧ x′ ` {y}skAuth∧
BBrec([b]) ∈ tr
(1)
=⇒∃BB, [b˜], [v], p. send(Auth, A, x′) ∈ tr ∧ x′ ` {y}skAuth
∧send(Auth,BB, 〈[b], [b˜], [v], p〉) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒y ∈ [b]
As BB is honest by topology TMV, it only records BBrec([b]) if
it has previously received this term from Auth and as the first
of four terms. As by TMV the channel (Auth,BB) is authentic,
Auth must have sent these terms for BB to receive them (Step
(1)). Next, as Auth is honest and follows its role specification,
the only messages sent by Auth that are signed by skAuth are
the ballots, which are also all contained in the recorded ballots
[b], i.e., in the first list of the only message that Auth sends
to BB (Step (2)). Again no message confusions are possible
as Auth only sends one message to BB and as there are no
parallel sessions. Finally, as the above observations hold for
any explicit signal S containing Auth’s signature, they hold in
particular for the signal S = Ev. Moreover, as BB is honest
there is only one signal BBpk(pkAuth) in the trace. Thus, for
any b, pkAuth, c such that BBpk(pkAuth) ∈ tr ∧ Ev(b, c) ∈ tr ∧
ver(c, pkAuth) = b it follows that, for some [b], BBrec([b]) ∈
tr ∧ b ∈ [b]. Therefore, the first disjunct of the definition
of Faulty(Auth, b) for ballots b 6=⊥ is also not satisfied by
tr and we conclude that for all ballots b it holds that tr /∈
Faulty(Auth, b).
Lemma 12. MixVote satisfies IndivVerif when run in the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let H be the distinguished voter for which the prop-
erty should hold, independently of whether or not there
are other (dishonest) voters in the system. Let tr be a
trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪ TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that
verifyH(H, b ∈ [b], true) ∈ tr and Vote(H, v) ∈ tr .
verifyH(H, b ∈ [b], true) ∈ tr ∧ Vote(H, v) ∈ tr
(1)
=⇒∃BB, D, P. knows(H, 〈D,P,BB, v〉) ∈ tr
∧rec(D,H, b) ∈ tr ∧ rec(BB, H, [b]) ∈ tr ∧ b ∈ [b]
∧Vote(H, v) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒send(D,H, b) ∈ tr ∧ send(BB, H, [b]) ∈ tr
∧Vote(H, v) ∈ tr
(3)
=⇒∃r, pkAuth, skD, v′. rec(H,D, v′) ∈ tr ∧ b = {{v′}rpkAuth}skD
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ Vote(H, v) ∈ tr
(4)
=⇒send(H,D, v′) ∈ tr ∧ b = {{v′}rpkAuth}skD
∧Vote(H, v) ∈ tr
(5)
=⇒send(H,D, v) ∈ tr ∧ b = {{v}rpkAuth}skD .
By the assumption tr ∈ TR(PrMV, T Auth+H+MV )∪TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ),
H is honest and thus only performs the check with the ballot
b that he has previously received from D and the list of
recorded ballots [b] that he has previously received from BB
(Step (1)). Moreover, b ∈ [b] holds since the last argument
of the verifiability check is true. By the topology TMV, the
channel (D,H) is secure and the channel (BB, H) is authentic.
Therefore, D and BB must respectively have sent the messages
b and [b] for H to receive them on these channels (Step (2)).
BB is honest by the topology TMV. Thus, BB only sends one
message containing a single list which was previously recorded
in the signal BBrec. Moreover, as there are no parallel sessions,
this list cannot be confused with another list sent by BB. It
follows in Step (3) that BBrec([b]) ∈ tr . The other parts of
Step (3) follow as D is honest by the topology TMV. Thus,
D only sends a ballot b that contains a vote v′, encrypted
and signed, that it has previously received from H . Also, no
message confusion is possible as there are no parallel sessions
and D only sends one message in the protocol. As by the
topology TMV the channel (H,D) is secure, H must have sent
v′ for D to receive it (Step (4)). As H is honest and there
are no parallel sessions, he only sends on the channel (H,D)
the vote that is also recorded in the signal Vote(H, v). Thus,
it holds that v = v′ and Step (5) follows.
Lemma 13. MixVote satisfies Tallied-as-Recorded when run in
the topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let tr be a trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that q1 = verifyA1(A,∃[pkuD].[pkuD] ⊆l
[pkD] ∧ [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]), true) ∈ tr and
q2 = verifyA2(A, verzk(p, [b˜], [v], pkAuth), true) ∈ tr .
q1 ∧ q2
(1)
=⇒q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ∃[r], pi. [b˜] = pi[{v}rpkAuth ]
(2)
=⇒q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ∃[skD]. [b˜] = pi[{v}rpkAuth ] ∧ [b] = [{b˜}skD ]
∧[pk(skD)] = [pkuD] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
(3)
=⇒q1 ∧ q2 ∧ [b] = pi[{{v}rpkAuth}skD ] ∧ [pk(skD)] = [pk
u
D]
∧[pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
(4)
=⇒∃BB. rec(BB, A, 〈[b], [b˜], [v], p, [pkD]〉) ∈ tr
(5)
=⇒send(BB, A, 〈[b], [b˜], [v], p, [pkD]〉) ∈ tr
(6)
=⇒BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBtal([v]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr .
Step (1) holds as the verification verifyA2 succeeds, indicated
by its third argument true, and by the definition of the
verification function for zero knowledge proofs verzk (see
Appendix C1). As the third argument of verifyA1 is also true
and by the definition of ⊆l (see Appendix C1), Step (2) holds.
Next, Step (3) combines the results of the first two steps. In
(4), we use that the auditor A is honest by the topology TMV
and follows its role specification. Thus, q1 and q2 are only in
the trace if A has previously received the corresponding lists
from BB. As the channel (BB, A) is authentic by the topology
TMV, BB must thus have sent these messages for A to receive
them on this channel (Step (5)). Finally, (6) holds as by the
topology TMV, BB is honest and thus only sends out these lists
if it has previously published them, i.e., the corresponding
signals were recorded in the trace. Thereby, as BB only sends
one message of this form and as there are no parallel sessions,
no message confusion is possible. Thus, we have shown that
all required signals are in the trace and that the lists have the
required relations.
Lemma 14. MixVote satisfies Uniqueness(Auth) when run in
the topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let tr be a trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′), b′ 6=⊥,
and BBrec([b]) ∈ tr .
b′ 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′) ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr
(1)
=⇒∃[b˜], [pkD], [H]. b′ 6=⊥ ∧tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′)
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr
∧BBH([H]) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒∃[pkuD]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr
∧BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ BBH([H]) ∈ tr ∧ [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD])
∧[pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
(3)
=⇒∃[skD]. BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr
∧BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ BBH([H]) ∈ tr ∧ [b] = [{b˜}skD ]
∧[pk(skD)] = [pkuD] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD].
Steps (1) holds as the bulletin board is honest by topology
TMV, thus when the recorded ballots are published, then the
lists [b˜], [pkD], and [H] have previously been published. As
tr /∈ Faulty(Auth, b′) for some ballot b′ 6=⊥, both disjunct
specified in the definition of Faulty(Auth, b′) for the case
b′ 6=⊥ must be false in tr . In particular, as the second disjunct
is false, all recorded ballots must contain a unique valid
signature, i.e., corresponding to a public key that is contained
in [pkD], indicated by Step (2). Step (3) holds by the definitions
of verL.
Let b be an arbitrary recorded ballot. By the above formula,
it has the form b = {b˜}skD for some signing key skD such that
pk(skD) ∈ [pkD] (thus ver(b, pk(skD)) 6=⊥) and such that no
other recorded ballot is associated with the same key skD.
As the bulletin board BB is honest by topology TMV and as
there are no parallel sessions, BB only publishes the list [pkD]
from its initial knowledge in the signal BBpkD. By the shared
initial knowledge and the setup of the protocol (there are no
parallel sessions), for each verification key pkD in the list [pkD]
from BB’s initial knowledge, there is exactly one device which
knows the corresponding signing key skD and one voter H
who is associated with this device. Moreover, the device and
voter associated with each verification key are distinct. Also,
the verification key pkD is together with the voter H in the
list in Corr([H, pkD]), and H is in the list [H]. Furthermore,
these list are correctly published on the bulletin board BB as
BB is honest by topology TMV. From this, all conjuncts in the
property’s definition (Definition 9) except for the sends already
follow.
We next establish that each skD is only known to one device
D at all times during the execution. First, by the specified
initial knowledge, the signing key is only known to this device
at the protocol’s start. Second, by the topology TMV the agent
instantiating the device is honest and follows its specification.
Therefore, D only sends one message, which contains the term
skD as a signature. By our equational theory, it is not possible
to extract a signing key from a signed message. Therefore, no
agent other than D knows skD during the protocol execution.
We have established that b = {b˜}skD is recorded on the
bulletin board and that no agent except D knows the term
skD. Thus, D must have computed b. As we have just argued
that D is honest, D only sends one message to its associated
voter H on a secure channel. Therefore, in all traces where b is
recorded on the bulletin board, the unique voter H must have
forwarded b, that is H must have sent a message containing
b to some agent A. Thus, send(H,A,m) is in the trace with
m ` b. The above reasoning holds for any ballot. Furthermore,
we argued that for each recorded ballot, there is a unique
associated signing key and device, i.e., distinct from those
associated with the other recorded ballots, and that each device
has a unique associated voter. Therefore, it follows that for
any two distinct recorded ballots the required signal send is
recorded with a distinct voter.
Lemma 15. MixVote satisfies EligVerif when run in the topolo-
gies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let tr be a trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) such that q1 = verifyA1(A,∃[pkuD].[pkuD] ⊆l
[pkD] ∧ [b˜] = verL([b], [pkuD]), true) ∈ tr and
q2 = verifyA2(A, verzk(p, [b˜], [v], pkAuth), true) ∈ tr and
let i and j be two natural numbers in {1, . . . , n}, where n is
the length of the lists [v] and [b].
q1 ∧ q2 ∧ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(1)
=⇒∃[skD], [r], pi. q1 ∧ q2 ∧ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
∧[b] = pi[{{v}rpkAuth}skD ] ∧ [pk(skD)] = [pk
u
D] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBtal([v]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr
(2)
=⇒∃[H]. q1 ∧ q2 ∧ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ [b] = pi[{{v}rpkAuth}skD ]
∧[pk(skD)] = [pkuD] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD] ∧ BBrec([b]) ∈ tr
∧BBtal([v]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr ∧ BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr
∧BBH([H]) ∈ tr
(3)
=⇒∃i′, j′, P1, P2,m1,m2. i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
∧[b] = pi[{{v}rpkAuth}skD ] ∧ [pk(skD)] = [pk
u
D] ∧ [pkuD] ⊆l [pkD]
∧BBrec([b]) ∈ tr ∧ BBtal([v]) ∈ tr ∧ BBpkD([pkD]) ∈ tr
∧BBwoS([b˜]) ∈ tr ∧ BBH([H]) ∈ tr
∧send([H]i′ , P1,m1) ∈ tr ∧ send([H]j′ , P2,m2) ∈ tr
∧m1 ` [b]i ∧m2 ` [b]j ∧ (i 6= j =⇒ [H]i′ 6= [H]j′).
Step (1) holds by the same reasoning as in the proof of
Lemma 13. Next, Step (2) holds as BB is honest by the
topology TMV, thus when the signals BBtal and BBrec are
recorded in the trace, then the signals BBwoS and BBH have
also been recorded. Step (3) holds by the reasoning in the
proof of Lemma 14, where we derived from Step (3) that
Uniqueness(Auth) holds. As for each vote v in [v] there is a
ballot b in [b] such that b = {{v}rpkAuth}skD , it follows that each
such send-signal in Step (3) contains a unique vote from the
final tally.
As we have argued in the proof of Lemma 14 that only
each voter’s device can compute such a ballot with the valid
verification key, for each voter H to send a message containing
the ballot, H must have previously learned it from his device
D. Moreover, as each device D is honest by the topology
TMV, D only computes the ballot b = {{v}rpkAuth}skD when
it has previously received v from its associated voter H on
a secure channel. Thus, for each voter H to send a ballot
of the form b = {{v}rpkAuth}skD , H must have previously sent
the corresponding vote v to his device. In particular, as there
are no parallel sessions and D only receives and sends one
message, no message confusion is possible. We conclude that
each (distinct) vote in the final tally must have been sent by
a (distinct) voter to his device.
Lemma 16. MixVote satisfies VoterA(Auth) when run in the
topologies T Auth
+H+
MV and T
H+
MV .
Proof. Let tr be a trace in TR(PrMV, T Auth
+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ). As all traces in TR(PrMV, T
Auth+H+
MV ) ∪
TR(PrMV, TH
+
MV ) satisfy Uniqueness(Auth) by Lemma 14 and
as the preconditions of Theorem 2 hold (i.e., the protocol
does not allow re-voting and a voter who abstains does not
send any messages), we use Theorem 2 to infer that tr
satisfies VoterA(Auth).
